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Executive Sunmnary
The World Development Report (2000) and the consultations preceding it have focused attention
on particularly important aspects of poverty - risk and vulnerability. The poor, especially, are
subject to a variety of risks that affect their short-term well-being and long-term ability to climb
out of poverty. Because they lack the ability to insure against risks, the poor often shape their
behavior and decision-making to minimize exposure to risks, even at the cost of economic
efficiency and long-term interest. Poverty and vulnerability are thus mutually reinforcing, each
likely to aggravate the other. As part of the Bank's recognition of this vulnerability and its
consequences, this paper reviews what is known about the risk-coping and risk-mitigating
behavior of the poor in South Asia, the support they receive from governments and NGOs and the
Bank's contributions. It also presents suggestions for a strategy that integrates efforts to reduce
poverty with efforts to overcome risk.
Since poverty and vulnerability are mutually reinforcing, measures that mitigate risk can also
bring meaningful reductions in poverty. Particularly for South Asia, where poverty is widespread
and resistant to many traditional policies, the paper argues that effective poverty-reduction
requires complementary risk-management measures that can cushion poor households against
temporary setbacks, so that transitory events do not produce permanent destitution. In addition to
the range of familiar safety-net programs such as targeted employment programs, credit and
insurance, the paper finds promise in the microfinance movement spreading throughout South
Asia and in informal, savings and insurance schemes. Such undertakings share one trait; they
link participants with market institutions. For economic growth to yield strong, sustained returns
in reducing poverty, markets must not only function efficiently but also enable the poor to gain
strength from them.
While standard poverty reduction measures have traditionally focused on ways to improve the
mean utility of a poor household, the objective of Social Protection is best understood in terms of
reducing the variance of household's utility over time. However, since poverty and vulnerability
are closely linked, the policy responses to them overlap considerably, with important synergies.
Having said that, a social protection strategy must extend beyond the traditional poverty reduction
measures, to focus on creating opportunities for households to manage risk better, primarily
through a variety of instruments that perform the role of safety nets. The focus of this paper will
be on these elements of a social protection strategy.
Social protection in developed countries have traditionally encompassed safety net measures like
unemployment and health benefits and insurance, social security and food stamps. For countries
in South Asia, where a vast majority of the poor are concentrated in the informal sector, the
existing level of institutional development - with, for instance, the near-absence of insurance
markets and institutions necessary to identify beneficiaries - strongly limnits the scope for social
protection through formal mechanisms. Improving the institutional capacity would thus be
imperative for social protection. However, given that such change is a lengthy process, the social
protection strategy for the region in the immediate future has to look beyond the traditional
formal mechanisms, and incorporate the potential role of existing programs like public works, as
well as programs that involve the use of informal community-based institutions.
Going beyond the specific programs under review, the current study's central message is a broad
one: an effective social protection strategy must consciously integrate risk management and
poverty reduction. They are two sides of the same coin.
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Poverty and Vulnerability
South Asia is home to the largest number of the world's poor. While the incidence of poverty as
defined by head-count ratio has shown some decline in all South Asian countries over the years, a
sizable proportion of the population in all the countries still live in poverty. Moreover,
conventional measurements - head-count ratios of the population of various countries below their
poverty lines - portray the static picture, but say little about the movement of households in and
out of poverty in response to shocks. The limited evidence available reveals such movements to
be quite common, and transitory poverty to be a dominant component of total poverty. Thus in
order to understanding vulnerability better, more comprehensive studies that analyze the
dynamics of income and poverty are imperative for South Asian countries.
The link between poverty and vulnerability arises from the fact that the poor have higher
exposure to a variety of risks, and also lack access to instruments to mitigate and cope with such
risks. Risks range from the household-specific (or idiosyncratic) danger of a crippling illness or
death, to the community-wide (covariant) risks posed by an economic downturn, a conflict or a
natural disaster. For the poor in South Asia, normal living conditions carry a higher-than-normal
risk to health, and labor markets in the informal sector where most of them are employed expose
them to high risks of unemployment. Harvest risks, additionally, raise higher threats to poor
farmers with restricted access to credit, pesticides, disease-resistant seeds and irrigation. Floods
and plagues, while affecting all, do tend to leave longer-lasting effects among the poor.
The literature documenting the consequences of risk for the poor includes a study of South Indian
villages where just the higher risk represented by a shift in the onset of the monsoon could cut the
farm profits of households in the lowest wealth quartile by 35%, compared to a 15% reduction for
median households and no effect on the wealthiest. Hardest hit everywhere are those who must
depend on others: children, the elderly, widows, the chronically ill and the disabled. Women are
also especially vulnerable in South Asia, according to evidence from a number of countries.
Compared to those who are better-off, the poor have relatively few opportunities to mitigate risks.
Being overwhelmingly concentrated in the informal sector, which is isolated from markets and
formal institutions, the poor have little access to formal risk-mitigating instruments. The market
failures in insurance and credit markets that arise mainly from information gaps can be
circumvented only through the use of collateral; the poor however seldom possess assets that can
be used as collateral. Thus to cope with shocks, poor households are often obliged to adopt
strategies with possible long-term adverse consequences, like withdrawing children from school
to contribute their labor to the family, selling crucial assets or crop inventories, or borrowing
from moneylenders at usurious rates of interest. Other than such coping measures, risk-
mitigation, whether through diversification in livelihoods or informal kinship-based
arrangements, can be potential strategies. Opportunities for diversification are however limited
for poor households, due to factors like lack of skills and assets required to start a new activity.
Thus their mechanisms for risk mitigation consist mostly of adopting low-risk, low-return
technologies, at the cost of income and productivity, or informal arrangements based on
migration and participation in kinship-based networks for mutual support. There is however
evidence to suggest that such informal arrangements, while common, are inadequate in protecting
the poor, and are also likely to prove inadequate in the case of wider community-level shocks.
The Role of Social Protection
Lack of access of the poor to formal instruments for risk-mitigation and coping, along with the
inadequacy and the costly nature of informal instruments, together provide the rationale for public
intervention in some form in the provision of safety nets, credit and insurance. Moreover,
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government participation can be justified on the grounds of the public good nature of these
programs, where the externalities generated cannot be internalized by any private institution.
An important justification for public intervention in safety net programs, such as public works
and cash transfers, has traditionally been redistribution undertaken with the goal of promoting
equity and improving welfare of the poor. This paper argues that in the presence of uncertainty,
the design of such redistribution programs should explicitly take into account the importance of
reducing volatility in the context of their immediate impact. This is however not to discount the
importance of redistribution programs that operate independent of a safety net objective, like
transferring or creating assets or providing free health and education services for the poor, that
should be an integral part of a long-term strategy to reduce poverty and vulnerability. In the
context of an overall strategy, it will be imperative for each country to take into account country-
specific factors to decide on an optimal mix of such programs that provide benefits independent
of shocks, and social protection measures that directly target volatility.
Acknowledging the varieties of vulnerability and the differences in conditions across countries, it
is nonetheless possible to suggest a social protection strategy that seeks to reduce risk, rnitigate its
impact and enhance the ability of the poor to cope with shocks. Many of the elements of such a
strategy derive from such long-standing programs as targeted public works and targeted transfers
to vulnerable groups, which can potentially provide risk mitigation and coping benefits. In
addition, innovative microfinance initiatives that are spreading in South Asia appear to offer
considerable benefits by providing access to credit. The informal mechanisms that drive the
success of such credit initiatives can also be harnessed for providing a range of financial services,
like savings and insurance, which act as instruments for risk mitigation.
Finally, while public safety nets like public works and targeted transfers can provide risk and
welfare benefits in the absence of adequately functioning financial markets in the short run, the
long-tenn solution would lie in correcting imperfections in credit and insurance markets,
particularly since there is evidence to suggest that market imperfections hurt lower income groups
disproportionately. Elimination of market constraints can be achieved through institutional
reforms, including liberalization of the financial sector along with the creation of regulatory
mechanisms that promote transparency. Such reforms should take precedence over a policy of
direct subsidization of credit and insurance by the government, which has largely proved to be a
failure in South Asia. This is mainly because the information problems that limit private
participation also tend to make government programs unsustainable; also, the nature of
government support often distorts the incentives of both private providers and clients. In the
short run, public support in insurance and credit should largely involve nurturing and providing
institutional support to innovative mechanisms like microfinance that seek to circumvent
information problems by the use of informal networks on the one hand, and undertaking financial
and regulatory reforms to facilitate market mechanisms on the other.
In deciding which programs are most likely to prove effective, it will be necessary to lay some
analytical groundwork. Beyond identifying the most vulnerable populations in each South Asian
nation, such inquiries should seek to classify the risks that threaten different vulnerable groups or
kinds of poor households according to their incidence and severity, an exercise attempted in
Chapter I. A companion effort would produce detailed evaluations of both the risk-reducing
impact of existing anti-poverty programs and the performance and potential of less traditional
approaches such as microfinance, issues addressed by subsequent chapters.
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Targeting Vulnerable Groups: Widows and Children
The fact that widows and working children are among the most vulnerable in most South Asian
countries should shape the priorities of policy-makers. While there is evidence, albeit indirect or
anecdotal given the paucity of data, of the special vulnerability of widows in most South Asian
settings, it receives inadequate attention from current public policy. Even safety net programs
that do exist, like the long-running state-government pension schemes for women in India, leave
much to be desired in terms of coverage and impact. Responding to the weaknesses of official
programs, grassroots organizations have developed imaginative measures for insurance, social
assistance and legal support for widows. As a foundation for action to reduce the vulnerability of
widows, there is a need for governments to evaluate both the adequacy and the accessibility of
existing safety-net programs. In cooperation with innovative NGOs, moreover, public efforts
should aim at enabling poor women - and poor widows in particular - to exercise guaranteed
legal rights and employ effective savings and insurance instruments to reduce the risks they face.
A social protection strategy that seeks to integrate efforts to reduce risk and poverty at the same
time must also take into account the problem of child labor. Conservative estimates put the
number of such working children in the region's five countries at 20-30 million, the largest
concentration in the world. Although definitions of child labor vary and sweeping statements
about the problem must be suspect, the need to supplement family incomes during times of stress
is clearly an important reason behind children going to work rather than school. At the same
time, the problem is attributable to the interaction of a complex range of factors that goes beyond
economic factors, like the lack of access to quality education leading to perceived low returns to
education vis-a-vis work, and social and cultural mores. A strategy to reduce child labor must
therefore adopt a holistic approach that addresses the full range of complex issues involved.
While some progress has been made in prohibiting hazardous working conditions for children,
South Asian governments have mostly been unable to institute enforceable bans on child labor.
What seems to be necessary is a combination of policies that include social protection and
poverty reduction programs that reduce the household's need for the child's earnings on the one
hand, and measures to increase demand-side incentives for schooling (such as targeted enrollment
subsidies, and increasing the availability of quality schooling) on the other. The few isolated
instances of success in addressing the problem of child labor in South Asian countries have
mostly been a result of community-based efforts, or partnerships between NGOs, government and
private initiatives, involving intensive efforts to create awareness and on inducing gradual
transition from work to school. Examples of such efforts are discussed in detail in Chapter II.
Assessing Government Programs
While it is true that strategies need to speak to specific country situations, some of the most
important policy mechanisms have mitigating and coping impacts on a wide range of risks
present in varying degrees throughout the region. Recognizing the wide-ranging impact of such
policy mechanisms, Chapter III of the paper evaluates the role, impact and potential of the ones
that are conmmonly used by governments in the region.
Public Works: Workfare programs, traditional mechanisms in South Asia and elsewhere for
boosting the income of the poor through short-term employment can be purposefully designed to
address vulnerability in the aftermath of community-wide shocks and seasonal downturns. What
has proved problematic is ensuring that the programs actually target the poor and the vulnerable.
Only if such public works are properly sited and timed, and if jobs can be distributed to match
demonstrated need, will the assistance reach the target clientele efficiently. The benefits of the
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program can also be directed towards the target population if the wages are kept low enough to
ensure self-selection by the needy into the program.
Bangladesh's 26-year-old Food for Work (FFW) and companion Test Relief (TR) programs
achieve a measure of self-selection by distributing wheat, considered an inferior grain, as
payment in kind at less-than-prevailing agricultural wages. The Employment Guarantee Scheme
(EGS) introduced by the Maharashtra state government in India in 1972 began as drought relief
but has expanded to entitle all able-bodied adults in rural areas to unskilled jobs. Apart from
stabilizing incomes during periods of low employment, EGS helps in mitigating the risk of labor
market shocks and harvest failures, primarily by credibly guaranteeing work during times of
need. Another large public works program in the region, India's countrywide Jawahar Rozgar
Yojana (JRY) scheme, is targeted by time (the off-season) as well as geography (districts
measured for their socio-economic backwardness). Unlike the EGS however, JRY's success in
reaching poor households is very much open to question. But while the average transfer benefits
from the program are low, consumption smoothing benefits may be considerable because of the
timing of the program.
Evaluating these public works programs with the emphasis on their place in a social protection
strategy, it seems clear that for risk mitigation, programs that are continuously available and
capable of emergency expansion produce the highest benefits. Local market levels should play
the decisive role in setting wages for unskilled labor with the understanding that higher payments
may bring higher transfer benefits, but at the expense of precision in targeting the poor and
desired labor intensity. Payments in kind that improve self-selection by the poor also carry higher
costs that may outweigh the advantages. Also, as with most other existing programs, evidence on
the impact of public works programs on vulnerability is inadequate, making further studies on the
subject imperative for more detailed analysis. Finally, while public works are important
mechanisms to reduce vulnerability, such programs do not reduce vulnerability from all sources,
nor are they able to reach all vulnerable groups, like the old, the infirm and children. Other
programs are thus needed to complement the role of public works, and targeted transfers in cash
or kind is an important class of such programs.
Transfers in Cash or Kind: As entrenched in government social policy as public works, various
means-tested social assistance programs in South Asia seek to make direct transfers to the poor
through old-age payments, child allowances, subsidies and waivers for basic services and targeted
human development programs. Taken together, the transfers represent short-term palliatives for
vulnerability and poverty. In many cases however, the programs' targeting efficiency and impact
on poverty are in doubt. Whether they mitigate risk, moreover, is an open question that is yet to
be addressed substantively in empirical evaluations.
Pakistan's 20-year-old program of redistributing wealth through Zakat and Ushr taxes is yet to
reach more than two million beneficiaries in any year in a country where many more live below
the poverty line. Only about half of the direct payments being made, moreover, go to the poorest
of the poor, those in the lowest expenditure quintile. Targeting problems are also apparent from
available evaluations of Sri Lanka's Samurdhi program, a large proportion of which consists of
direct transfers in the form of food stamp grants.
Under the circumstances, while existing government public works and cash transfer programs can
be seen as important mechanisms of social protection, laying the foundations for a comprehensive
social protection strategy that addresses poverty and vulnerability together would require a
broader range of initiatives and reform of many of the existing ones. Facilitating innovative
microfinance schemes that use group-based and other form of informal mechanisms to provide
credit services would be a crucial element of such a strategy.
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Microfinance: The spread of microfinance in recent years in South Asia offers important lessons.
As of 1997, microfinance institutions in the region had $900 million in 2.8 rnillion outstanding
loans. Group-lending schemes, used by 93 percent of microfinance institutions in South Asia, are
often able to circumvent the common sources of market failures, namely adverse selection and
moral hazard, associated with conventional lending. By relying on peer pressure and the social
information that the poor have about each other to monitor and enforce contracts, group-based
lending provides incentives for borrowers to repay and improves selection of borrowers.
The evidence on the poverty-reducing impact of microfinance is however inconclusive - targeting
has not been universally successful, and studies have documented barriers to participation in
programs for the very poor. Moreover, a large proportion of microcredit loans seem to be going
towards consumption smoothing - particularly for extreme poor households - instead of
productive investment. In the absence of alternate forms of insurance, use of microcredit for
consumption smoothing helps to reduce short run vulnerability, and is especially crucial for the
extreme poor. However, credit used for non-investment purpose does not generate income,
suggesting that for the poorest microfinance borrowers, consumption smoothing often occurs at
the expense of long run improvements in economic status. Finally, the cushion that microcredit
provides may prove highly inadequate if disaster strikes a whole community or, as in the 1998
Bangladesh floods, almost an entire nation. The vulnerability of the smaller microfinance
institutions themselves to such calamities suggests the advisability of creating a separate disaster
fund to tide the lenders through such widespread adversity.
The tradeoff between the long-term objectives of microfinance and its short-term use for
consumption-smoothing suggest that providing alternative means of risk mitigation to the poor,
for example in the form of access to insurance and saving schemes, can help microfinance
achieve its long-term poverty reduction objectives. Such programs can be based on principles
similar to those microcredit rely on, namely the use of informal social networks and local
knowledge to circumvent information problems and mobilize support and awareness. Also, the
fact that insurance provided by microfinance is inadequate against covariant shocks also
underscores the importance of devising alternate insurance mechanisms specially designed for
such risks. Chapter IV explores some of these relatively new directions in social protection.
Innovative Programs for Saving and Insurance Services
Savings can be a valuable instrument for risk mitigation and coping among the poor. While early
microfinance programs were not effective in mobilizing savings, since it was thought that the
poor are too poor to save, recent experience has shown that even poor households are eager to
save if provided with safe, flexible and accessible accounts and attractive interest rates.
Institutions like Safe Save in Bangladesh have been able to rely on the savings they mobilize for a
majority of their credit activities, thus moving close to self-sustainability. Key to the success of
these institutions in mobilizing savings from the poor is their ability to organize communities at
the grassroot level, while decentralizing key elements of decision-making to groups within
communities, which has led to ownership and commitment.
Another equally important instrument for mitigating and coping with risk, namely insurance, has
been largely absent or ineffective for the poor. In rural areas, insurance programs have mostly
been limited to crop insurance schemes to address harvest risk. Commercial crop insurance have
had little impact - the rural poor comprise largely of either the landless or farmers who do not
grow the crops that are usually insured, and most commercial banks focus on large commercial
farms rather than on smaller holdings or riskier clients. A strong rationale for large-scale public
intervention in crop insurance is that such schemes can pool risks at a national or regional level,
and therefore also be able to insure riskier clients like poor farmers. However, public crop
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insurance in most countries in the region has proved to be not only unsustainable due to high
costs, but also largely ineffective, due to a number of factors: lack of institutional capability,
information problems that lead to moral hazard and adverse selection among clients, and distorted
incentives for insurers due to availability of public funds to fall back on. While some public
subsidies will no doubt be necessary for successful crop insurance, in order to be sustainable such
schemes must operate on a commercial basis - focusing on insurable risks and calculating
premiums based on actuarial data - and deny insurers automatic access to funds to cover losses.
In the near-absence of formal insurance against idiosyncratic risks faced by the poor, innovative
attempts by community-based initiatives - often associated with microfinance institutions - have
developed to provide coverage in the areas of health, life and asset insurance. Too recent to be
definitively evaluated, insurance programs like Grameen Kalyan in Bangladesh and the program
run by the Self-Employed Women's Association in India have indicated the potential role and
sustainability of such initiatives. While the insurance products provided by these schemes are
formal in nature, the delivery of products is carried out through organization at the community
level, facilitated by the trust created by the existing relationship between the institutions and their
clients. The full potential of community-based innovations can be realized if they are
incorporated in the overall social protection strategy, which would help in replicating so far
isolated efforts on a larger scale. The government's role in such a strategy would be to play the
role of facilitator, through creating the right institutional framework, facilitating linking of
microfinance institutions to markets, and contributing in initial financing if necessary.
The problems with traditional publicly funded crop insurance programs demand innovative
solutions; one could be area-based index insurance contracts, where contracts are written against
specific perils or events, like loss in average yield in the area, drought or flood, that are defined
and recorded at a regional level. Insurance is sold as standard contract for each unit purchased
where buyers are free to purchase as many units as they want to. Some of the attractive features
of such schemes are low cost of administering, ease of marketing, affordability for the poor, and
low moral hazard problems. Above all, it can be a sustainable way of insuring the rural
population against covariant risks. However insuring against covariant risks also exposes the
insurer to the risk of having to pay out huge indemnities at some instant; international financial
markets can play an important role in hedging against such risk through mechanisms like
reinsurance. Although private provision of such insurance should be the goal, public intervention
may be needed in South Asia to provide the initial impetus, possibly in areas of credibly
monitoring natural events, financing and creating regulatory framework.
If the systemic correlated risk faced by an individual is eliminated through index based contract,
the only remaining risk the individual faces is of the idiosyncratic kind, which can be more easily
insured through conventional insurance or credit markets, as well as through community-based
mechanisms described above. Thus all the different mechanisms described above fit into an
overall strategy of insuring the risks of the poor.
Pension Reforms
The elderly among the poor are an especially vulnerable group, and any social protection strategy
should address their risks explicitly. On the face of it, formal pension schemes in South Asia are
unlikely to have great impact in reducing the vulnerability of the elderly poor. Such measures
(based on evidence from India) are estimated to cover less than 10% of the region's workforce,
largely excluding the informal sector, where the overwhelming majority of the poor earn their
livings. Even where pensions are available to working contributors, poor households are more
likely to seek to shield themselves against the immediate perils of health, harvest and
unemployment risks.
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As discussed in Chapter IV, with significant reforms, that picture could change. A recent study
of India's system underscores the need to develop a multi-pillar structure that would provide
publicly funded benefits to those in need of social assistance, and participant-funded plans that
define contributions for distribution after retirement. Where financial markets are experiencing
on-going deregulation, as in India, opportunities are opening up for the creation of a competitive
pension sector. At the lower end of the income scale, the work of informal savings, credit and
insurance institutions also creates new possibilities for social assistance to serve the elderly poor.
Towards a Comprehensive Strategy for Social Protection
This report underscores the interdependence of poverty and vulnerability, and argues the need for
a comprehensive social protection strategy that can address both. Although it is not possible to
give a detailed blueprint for such a strategy, the broad building blocks that would underlie it are
identifiable, as detailed in Chapter V of the paper. Designing a strategy should involve analytical
assessment of specific kinds of risks and institutional arrangements relevant to each country,
before an optimal mix of country-specific policies can be decided on. The country-specific
strategies must have a poverty focus, given the close and mutually reinforcing relationship
between poverty and vulnerability in the region. Moreover, the strategies should be informed by
evaluations of existing forms of public and private (informal and formal) risk-mitigating and
coping mechanisms in each country, that can generate suggestions for strengthening existing
programs and expanding promising initiatives.
Briefly, the design of an optimal strategy for each country would involve (a) identifying the
priorities in terms of vulnerable groups and specific risks, (b) deciding on the combination of
instruments to be used, (c) setting goals for the programs, and (d) developing an implementation
structure, identifying strategic partners on the ground. The review conducted in this paper also
suggests some essential elements of a social protection strategy that are broadly applicable to the
region as a whole. These elements, outlined below, must then be modified and adapted for
specific country needs, as well as the institutional capability of individual countries.
Strengthening Risk-Mitigating Options: Institutional reforms that promote and expand market
opportunities, backed by a regulatory environment that induce competitive behavior, are intrinsic
elements of a long-term social protection strategy for all countries in the region. However, such
institutional changes will take time to have their desired effect. Meanwhile, given the prevalence
of risk and vulnerability in the region, it will be imperative for governments to incorporate
measures that provide risk management options in the immediate future. As suggested by this
paper, the options range from expanding and strengthening existing options in public safety net
programs, including public works and targeted transfers, to building on recent successful
experiences with community-based instruments like microfinance. The review of existing
government, private or community based options in this paper provides some guidelines to
improve the functioning of such programs as safety nets, and also helps identify the possible role
that public policy can play in facilitating the expansion of informal, community-based initiatives.
The medium and long-term strategy for social protection in each country must include broad-
based institutional reforms that create market opportunities to promote growth and facilitate
formal mechanisms for risk management. Such reforms will also allow informal initiatives like
microfinance institutions to make use of market opportunities - crucial for their expansion and
sustainability. Specific priority areas would be in designing comprehensive pension reform to
mitigate the risks of old age, and creating the right regulatory environment to help reduce
information problems in financial markets. Equally important will be to design insurance to
address covariant or community-wide risks. In the light of the failure of subsidized crop
insurance schemes in the past, index-based insurance, which by design reduces transactions cost
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and moral hazard problems, may help mitigate some of these covariant risks. Finally, poverty-
reducing interventions, even when they do not address risk management directly, are important
long-term measures for reducing risk. One example of such intervention would be initiatives to
improve income diversification opportunities for the poor, by expanding access to credit, training,
and extension services.
Strengthening Risk-Coping Options: Since a large number of risks cannot be wholly eliminated, a
social protection strategy must also focus on providing risk-coping options. This is especially
true in the case of such covariant shocks as natural disasters, where most insurance mechanisms,
formal and informnal, tend to fail. A proper disaster-management strategy, planned in advance
and implemented promptly, would help in coping with such shocks. The strategy must develop
mechanisms for immediate and widespread relief efforts in the event of the disaster, as well as for
addressing the more long-term needs of the affected people, in the form of assistance to rebuild
their homes and livelihood. Public works programs can play an important role in providing
livelihood, while helping in the process of rebuilding communities and infrastructure.
Integrating Social Protection into the World Bank's Program in South Asia
The principles outlined so far should guide the Bank's involvement, along with partners in
respective governments, in designing social protection strategies for individual countries in South
Asia. There is also a need to integrate social protection objectives in analytical work conducted
by the Bank to underpin the development strategy for individual countries, as well as in specific
programs undertaken by the Bank in various sectors. As a first step it will be important to assess
the role of existing Bank supported projects, encompassing diverse areas including rural and
social development, environment and infrastructure, in creating opportunities for social
protection. Furthermore, given the mutually reinforcing relationship between poverty and
vulnerability, there is a need to address issues of risk, vulnerability and social protection more
exhaustively in country Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiatives than they have been
so far. For this, country social risk assessments should be made an integral part of the
background work for PRSP, possibly by having analytical initiatives like Public Expenditure
Reviews (PERs) and Poverty Assessments explicitly address risk and vulnerability issues.
Integration of social protection in operational work of the Bank on the ground can be achieved
through a number of avenues. For example, Bank supported anti-poverty programs (e.g. Poverty
Alleviation Funds) could be expanded to include financial instruments that can better deal with
risk. The Bank can also have a role in providing financial and technical assistance for pilot
initiatives of innovative programs highlighted in this report, like savings and insurance schemes
using local, community-based institutions. Such endeavors should have a special focus on
monitoring and evaluation, to help learn the best practices on the ground, in order to inform
scaling-up of current efforts and future design.
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I. Rationale For A Social Protection Strategy
As articulated in the 1990 World Development Report, the World Bank's cornerstone for poverty-
reduction policy rests on three critical elements: promoting growth to foster and expand opportunity,
supporting investments in health and education to encourage human development and creating safety nets.
Safety nets, however, are envisioned primarily as protection for the poor in times of macroeconomic
downturns. Although implicitly recognizing some of the vulnerability that afflicts the poor in developing
countries, the poverty-reduction strategy has not explicitly recognized a broad range of risks as a factor in
poverty and in measures to combat it.
Incorporating risk explicitly in a poverty-reduction strategy, however, is important -- evidence has shown
that the poor suffer disproportionately from the consequences of various kinds of risk. Often left destitute
by the consequences of a shock, the poor, moreover, lack access to formal instruments for mitigating risks
and are thus compelled to conduct their affairs in ways that weaken their ability to break out of poverty.
The problem is especially relevant to South Asia, where the majority of the poor are concentrated in the
informal sector, mostly in rural areas, where formal credit and insurance markets do not penetrate. In
such circumstances, traditional poverty reduction strategies that accord risk little more than indirect
attention may not produce the desired results. In recognition of this reality, the recent World
Development Report (World Bank, 2000) has defined the three pillars of a poverty reduction strategy as
opportunity, empowerment and security. This strategy paper for South Asia focuses on security concerns,
going beyond the traditional approach toward reducing poverty to develop a social protection strategy
dedicated to the objective of mitigating and coping with risk. In doing this, the paper draws from the
discussion in the Social Protection Sector Strategy paper (World Bank, 2001), applying the insights and
framework developed there to the specific context of South Asia.
Poverty and Vulnerability in South Asia
South Asia is home to the largest number of the world's poor. While the incidence of poverty as defined
by head-count ratio has shown some decline in all South Asian countries over the years, a sizable
proportion of the population in all the countries still live in poverty (Figure 1). In spite of growing
relatively well over the recent decade, per capita GNP (with Purchasing Power Parity or PPP) of all
countries and for the region as a whole remains low and is but a small fraction of that for middle-income
countries (Figure 2). For a majority of countries in the region, average annual growth of GNP (at PPP)
over the period 1989-99 has been higher than that in 1979-89, and has surpassed average rates for low-
income and middle-income countries (Figure 3). In spite of the general improvement in growth,
according to some evidence that is by no means conclusive, the pace of poverty reduction has slowed
down in most countries in the region in recent years.
Poverty estimates like head-count ratio can however represent only the static status of poverty, and not its
dynamic aspects, namely the fluctuations in income, consumption and general well-being of the poor, as
well as the cause and impact of these fluctuations. Recent research using longitudinal household survey
data has shown that poverty is often a temporary phenomenon, with a large number of households moving
frequently into and out of poverty due to transitory shocks such as illness or loss of employment. A 9-year
panel survey of households in south Indian villages found that movements into and out of poverty were
the norm for most households - only 20 percent were poor throughout the period, while only 12 percent
were never poor.
Figure 1: Head Count Ratios with National Poverty Lines
(for latest available years)
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Figure 3: Average Annual Growth of GNP (Constant 1995 $)
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A direct consequence of such fluctuations is vulnerability, which can be defined as the likelihood of being
adversely affected by a shock that usually causes consumption levels, or other factors that determine well-
being, to drop. While vulnerability can affect a broad range of the population, as poverty assessments of
a number of countries as well as other studies have shown, for various reasons the poor are more likely to
bear its worst consequences. In the case of South Asia, the poor are exposed to a wide variety of risks
against which they have little protection, mainly because they are overwhelmingly concentrated in rural
areas and in the large informal sectors found in all countries, where formal (market-based as well as
public) instruments of social protection are almost non-existent.
Even among the poor, certain groups, like children, the elderly, widows (and women in general) are
especially vulnerable. Although existing studies contain very little quantitative evidence, primarily due to
lack of suitable data, qualitative studies offer compelling anecdotal accounts of the high vulnerability of
certain groups within poor households. While such groups exist in most developing countries, disparities
across groups are especially stark in most South Asian countries, with various aggregate indicators
suggesting deep intra-household differences with likely implications for vulnerability. For example, the
male-female gap in primary enrollment rate in Pakistan is estimated at more than 20 percentage points.
Significant male-female differences persist in education and health outcomes across South Asia, resulting
in low levels of human capital for women, which increases their vulnerability; the social and cultural
factors that are responsible for such gender differences also contribute to vulnerability of women. Studies
have shown that women in South Asia often suffer more from the consequences of adverse shocks than
men.
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Moreover, factors specific to countries in the region contribute to the acute vulnerability of certain
groups. Social and cultural factors contribute to relatively higher deprivation - and therefore
vulnerability - of widows, as measured by various indicators of well-being. For example, a recent
demographic study indicates that mortality rates among Indian widows are about twice as high as among
married women of the same age; similar results have also been found in Bangladesh.3 Also, prevalence of
child labor in some areas creates serious risks for large populations of children, especially in urban areas.
Social Protection and Poverty Reduction
Poverty is commonly understood in terms of inadequate consumption, education, health and other
indicators of human welfare. However, poverty is also associated with insecurity and fear for the future -
insecurity that stems from inability to cope with risk -, which is the dimension where social protection
policy plays a direct role. Risks, best understood as the probability of shocks occurring that can adversely
affect well being, can be unanticipated, like illness or a drought, or anticipated, like seasonal downturns in
farm income (where severity but not timing is in doubt). It is useful to distinguish between two broad
forms of risks or shocks, idiosyncratic and covariant - the former affects individual households, with the
correlation of the occurrence of shocks across households being very low, the incidence of the latter on
the other hand is highly correlated across households belonging to a community.
While standard poverty reduction measures have traditionally focused on ways to improve the mean
utility of a poor household, the objective of Social Protection is best understood in terms of reducing the
variance of household's utility over time. Thus while policies promoting growth and increasing access to
health and education services improve the average well being of the poor, policies that create
opportunities for households to manage risk better, thus reducing the impact of shocks, fall under the
purview of social protection. It is however important to realize that since poverty and vulnerability are
closely linked and reinforce each other, the policy responses to them overlap considerably, and also have
important synergies. Improvements in the income opportunities and human capital of the poor, for
example, would naturally reduce their vulnerability to adverse shocks, and avoiding disastrous effects of
shocks would certainly promote their ability to climb out of poverty. In fact, all policy measures designed
to reduce poverty, since they would also reduce the risks households are exposed to, would be important
elements of a social protection strategy. However, the role of social protection must extend beyond such
policies, and explicitly address the issue of risk management, primarily through a variety of instruments
that perform the role of safety nets. The focus of this paper will be on these elements of a social
protection strategy, and the crucial role of such a strategy over and beyond what is normally considered a
poverty reduction policy will become clearer as the discussion proceeds.
Social protection in developed countries have traditionally encompassed measures like unemployment
and health benefits and insurance, social security, pensions and targeted welfare programs like food
stamps, which provide protection against shocks. While such programs are usually funded publicly
(private provision, especially in areas of insurance, can also be seen), they are administered through an
elaborate set of formal institutional mechanism to identify beneficiaries and deliver services. Developing
countries, on the other hand, lack the resources necessary to provide such safety nets to the large sections
of the population that need them, and even the resources which are available cannot be put to optimum
use because of the lack of institutions necessary to identify beneficiaries and provide targeted assistance.
Private provision of insurance is stymied by the lack of institutional and regulatory mechanisms that lead
to market failures. For countries in South Asia, where a vast majority of the poor are concentrated in the
informal sector, the existing level of institutional development strongly limits the scope for social
protection through formal mechanisms. Improving the institutional capacity would thus be imperative for
social protection. However, given that such change is a lengthy process, the social protection strategy for
the region in the immediate future has to look beyond the traditional formal mechanisms, and incorporate
the potential role of existing programs like public works, as well as programs that involve the use of
informal community-based institutions.
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Box 1.1: The Dermition and Measurement of Vulnerability
Vulnerability can be defined as the expected welfare loss above a socially accepted norm which is caused by
uncertain events and the lack of appropriate risk management instruments. Susceptibility to such uncertain or
risky events would depend on a number of individual characteristics like age, gender, location and so on. A
definition to vulnerability must thus take into account a range of factors like sources of risks, personal or
household characteristics that determine exposure to risks, access to risk management instruments, and the time
frame over which the negative consequences of a shock persist. The World Bank has recently moved towards
operationalizing a definition for vulnerability that incorporates these key elements.4
Arriving at a satisfactory measurement of vulnerability poses an additional set of challenges. The common
practice so far has been to look at consumption of households in order to detect patterns that suggest vulnerability.
Measuring vulnerability in terms of consumption has its undeniable appeal - first, because vulnerability in most
cases will affect consumption, and second, because changes in consumption are the most easily observable and
measurable outcomes of vulnerability. For example, Morduch (1998a) and Pitt and Khandker (1998) use
measures of consumption variability, like the coefficient of variation of consumption, or the variance of log
consumption. A somewhat different approach is adopted by Amin, Rai and Topa (1999), who estimate
household-specific vulnerability parameters where a household is considered vulnerable if idiosyncratic income
shocks are passed on to current consumption. By this measure, a household is not vulnerable if it is only affected
by aggregate village-level fluctuations in income and not by idiosyncratic shocks to the particular household's
income or resources. Jalan and Ravallion use a similar measure in their study of vulnerability in rural China.
Another way to measure the vulnerability of the poor and the near-poor is to look at how often a household is
above or below the poverty line over a given period, as done by Gaiha and Deolalikar for a nine-year panel survey
of south Indian villages.
However, vulnerability extends to a number of other dimensions that may not be entirely captured by
consumption evidence. Children's health and development, physical well-being, social capital, family sizes and
insecurity of old age are but some of the dimensions where vulnerability can have adverse impacts. Since many
of these effects are hard to observe, let alone measure, an enormous measurement challenge faces studies of
vulnerability among the poor. Vulnerability along some of these dimensions can only be addressed through
detailed qualitative surveys, which should preferably be aligned with parallel quantitative surveys to ensure
comparability of vulnerability along these dimensions with income and consumption volatility.
The Measurement Challenge
In order to formulate a strategy, it will be imperative to understand vulnerability - the likelihood of
experiencing drops in utility as a result of shocks - in terms of its nature, causes and impact. This would
involve not only examining the particular factors that place individuals, households and communities at
risk of poverty or worsened poverty, but also measuring effectively the extent to which the poor are
vulnerable. Analytically, this would require exploring the dynamics of poverty, namely the movement of
households into and out of poverty and the likelihood that those who are already poor could fall into
deeper poverty, and the factors that determine these movements. Box 1.1 describes some of the objective
measures of vulnerability developed in economic literature, as well as some of the limitations of and
challenges faced by such empirical estimates. One of the most significant obstacles to being able to
reliably measure vulnerability is the lack of availability of panel data for most South Asian countries.
Identifying the causes and indicators of vulnerability would also be greatly facilitated by suitably
incorporating qualitative information to capture the sources of non-income dimensions of risk, which may
not be fully captured by quantitative data.
How Vulnerability Affects the Poor
It is not difficult to see why the poor are among the most vulnerable in any society. Poor households
usually lack land, financial assets or other mechanisms to tide them over in the event of a shock; another
contributing factor is the generally less-diversified sources of the income the poor receive. In addition, in
order to cope with a shock, the poor often have to disinvest whatever meager resources they do possess,
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often at the cost of long-term potential to climb out of poverty. In the absence of the risk-mitigating
mechanisms available to the more fortunate, the poor are also compelled to make choices that affect their
long-term productivity. Thus not only are the poor less resilient to shocks, the strategies they are
compelled to adopt can further trap them in a cycle of low productivity and low income. Ample evidence
in existing literature describes the extent of income fluctuation the poor are subject to. A study of villages
in south India showed that an increase in risk, represented by a 1 percent increase in the coefficient of
variation of the date of the onset of the monsoon, reduced farm profits of the households in the bottom
wealth quartile by 35 percent, compared to only 15 percent for the median household, and almost none for
the wealthiest.5
Attempting to protect themselves against income fluctuations, poor households must find ways to reduce
vulnerability through informal channels which can be classified either as mechanisms of self-protection or
as group-based relationships between households.6
Self Protection - Costs and Limitations
Self-protection refers to ex ante and ex post measures taken by individual households to mitigate risk. Ex
ante measures are adopted in order to minimize exposure to risk by taking anticipatory precautions. In the
presence of inadequately insured risk, the rational measure of a risk-averse poor household would often
be to adopt technologies that are less risky, even if it is at the cost of lower expected returns. For
example, in rural south India, farmers have been slow to adopt improved varieties of sorghum and rice
offering higher average yields than traditional crops along with a higher risk of failure, out of concern
with protecting themselves against risk. There is evidence that in risk-prone areas of India, households
may sacrifice as much as 25 percent of average income to reduce exposure to shocks.7 The poor also
enter into credit/land arrangements like share tenancy and tied labor that balance risk against average
return. Besides being costly in terns of potential income for the household, such behavior limits
experimentation and stifles innovation, which are important for growth and development.
While diversifying income sources is another rational ex ante measure to smooth income flow, such
smoothing is often imperfect, particularly in rural areas. This is largely because firstly, non-farm income
tends to move with farm income during times of crisis, and secondly, opportunities for diversification are
extremely limited for poor households, due to their lack of assets required to start a new activity and lack
of skills. Empirical research also shows that poor households in developing countries often engage in
precautionary savings in anticipation of income shocks. Since high-frequency consumption smoothing
would necessitate liquidity, poor households may be driven to accumulate highly liquid assets at the cost
of less liquid (and higher-yielding) productive investment for farm or other household enterprises. There
is evidence that such choice of asset portfolio has costs in terms of loss of productivity and income.9
Self-protection can also take the form of ex post measures, when unanticipated downturns cause
individual households to draw on savings, sell assets acquired during better times, increase labor supply
or borrow from rotating savings or credit associations. Although studies have found evidence for the use
of buffer crops, in particular, for smoothing consumption,10 such opportunities tend to be limited for the
poor - studies in rural India show that buffer stocks are used only by relatively large landholders to
smooth fluctuations in income, evidently because only they possess such stocks." Moreover, in times of
community-level shocks, prices may fall because a large number of households are offering assets in the
market, with the result that the sale of such assets may not generate enough resources.'2 Even when the
poor do have some assets to sell, being compelled by short-term survival needs to sell their few assets for
very low returns in the aftermath of a shock, may adversely affect their long-term productivity for which
the assets would have been valuable.
Because they own few assets in the first place, the poor are more likely to rely on increasing their labor
supply in times of a shock, and by diversifying labor supply across additional household members, like
6
women or children. Evidence has shown that in response to income shocks, poor households often have
to draw on the labor of their school-age children, interrupting their schooling.'3 In so far as erratic school
attendance lowers educational attainment and thus the children's future productivity, such responses to
income shocks are costly in terms of perpetuating poverty. Household responses to risk may also have
disproportionately unfavorable effects on certain members of the household. Studies in India have found
that girls' nutrition suffered more than boys' during slack seasons; price changes have also been found to
affect girls' consumption more than boys'.14 All these evidence point to existence of intra-household
effects of shock that are hard to measure but of great importance in terms of impact on well being.
Group Based Mechanisms - Role and Limitations
The poor also rely on personalized or group-based relationships, to take ex ante measures for mitigating
risk as well as to cope with the consequences of shock. Relationships that have often been developed
over years in effect allow households to tap into a store of community resources during times of crisis.
Interest-free lending of surplus land to poor households, or loans where the terms of repayment are
conditioned on income realized are examples of such expedients. Ex post group-based measures often
take the form of gift exchanges based on a tacit agreement to reciprocate, as well as borrowing or lending
among members of a group in times of need, using the ability of members of the mutual support network
to monitor each other's repayment. Evidence indicates that large amounts of such transfers occur among
poor households in developing countries. 15 Such informal risk sharing based on reciprocity would be
more effective against shocks that do not affect the whole network, with the result that wider the network,
broader is the extent of potential risk sharing and consumption smoothing.
Townsend (1994) finds strong evidence for risk-sharing in three ICRISAT villages in South India,
especially against idiosyncratic, and not covariant, shocks; however even in case of idiosyncratic shocks,
evidence suggests that consumption smoothing was only partial.16 Such findings not only confirm the
risk-sharing role played by informal group-based arrangements, but also underline their limitations,
particularly in protecting the poor.
Firstly, informal networks often exclude the poor. Informal insurance can work if people attach enough
importance to the future, since compliance is ensured by the fear of exclusion from the arrangement in
future. Since a person in poverty is more likely to value the present more than the future, the poor may
drop out of such informal arrangements. Poorer members may also be excluded from arrangements by
richer members; or the network itself may be weakened by the rich opting out over time from such
arrangements, perceiving greater benefit in forming a group with only the rich, or being on their own.'7
Secondly, group-based arrangements, even when the poor participate in them, may not provide enough
protection. Studies have found that in rural South India, the poor have only limited insurance, even
against idiosyncratic shocks, from informal networks.'8 Evidence from India and China indicate that the
poor and the landless are much less protected against income fluctuations than the rich and large
landholders. Another study has estimated transfers to be less than 10 percent of the size of income shocks
typically in bad periods.19 Insurance may also deteriorate with distance, since informal networks tend to
become less effective as the social ties that bind them matter less over long distances.20 Finally, informal
arrangements can also lead to exploitative scenarios where the richer members of the group, by virtue of
their superior bargaining position, can extract the entire available surplus from the poor, by compelling
them to provide labor for very low wages in return for protection during hard times for example.21
Mutual insurance and kinship networks are also unlikely to provide adequate insurance in the case of
village or community-level shocks,22 primarily because their risk-pools are not sufficiently diversified.
Apart from that, informal group-based mechanisms work through reciprocity that is self-enforced through
norms and social pressure but prone to fall apart during times of high stress when many members are
likely to choose to hold on to whatever they have rather than share it. Thus informal arrangements,
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coming under the highest stress during especially hard times when insurance is needed most, are likely to
fail the test.
Rationale for Intervention
The discussion so far indicates that firstly, the poor suffer from a high degree of vulnerability, and
secondly, given the absence of formal safety net mechanisms, rely to a large degree on self-protection and
group-based arrangements to protect themselves against risk. However these household and community
level strategies usually provide inadequate protection to the poor, and moreover are likely to lead to
adjustments with significant long-term negative effects on their productivity and ability to climb out of
poverty.
It is also important to understand why formal market-based instruments for risk management are
unavailable to the poor. The reasons for this are mainly to do with the concentration of the poor in rural
areas and in the informal sector in both rural and urban areas of South Asian countries. Isolation of the
poor from the formal sectors (which are likely to be urban-based) means that market-based institutions
have very little information about the poor and almost no ability to monitor, which leads to significant
adverse selection and moral hazard problems that contribute to market failures in insurance and credit.
Such market failures, along with the inadequacy and the costly nature of informal instruments, together
provide the rationale for public intervention in some form in the provision of safety nets, credit and
insurance for the poor. In the case of a range of safety net programs, such as public works and targeted
transfers to vulnerable groups among the poor like the elderly and widows, government participation is
justified on the grounds of the public good nature those programs, where the externalities generated
cannot be internalized by any private institution.
An important justification for public intervention in the form of safety net programs such as public works
and direct transfers like social assistance has traditionally been redistribution undertaken with the goal of
promoting equity and improving welfare of the poor. While these considerations are critical,
incorporating the objective of social protection can have significant implications for the design and
targeting of such programs. To see what this means, one should note that in the presence of uncertainty
or risk, a redistribution program, in order to raise the welfare of its beneficiaries, should aim to increase
their expected utilities. It is easy to see that in the presence of a high degree of volatility, for individuals
who are risk-averse - and there are strong reasons to believe that most poor people fall into this category
- the increase in expected utility for the marginal dollar of transfer will tend to be higher if the transfers
are targeted to reduce the impact of shocks to income and consumption flows. In other words, given a
budget constraint for expenditures on transfers, the impact of redistributive transfers on welfare may be
maximized by targeting transfers to perform a role similar to that of insurance, that of smoothing income
and consumption flows when there is high volatility in these flows. Consequently, Chapter III of this
paper will discuss the extent to which existing redistributive safety net programs do perform this role, and
how they can be improved upon with this objective in mind.
The redistribution rationale for public expenditure on safety nets is obviously distinct from the
aforementioned rationale of addressing market failures for intervention in credit and insurance markets.
However, there are important links between the two. The primary reason why redistribution schemes like
public works and direct transfers need to address volatility in income and consumption, is that credit and
insurance markets do not function properly in the first place. If, for example, well-functioning credit and
insurance programs were able to insure against risk and volatility, redistribution programs could achieve
their welfare and equity objectives by simply making transfers independent of shocks - a classic example
of this would be a land reform program which aims to rearrange the "initial endowments" in a manner
consistent with equity and welfare goals.
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That said, the arguments above are not to suggest that in the presence of risk and uncertainty,
redistribution programs like land reforms or providing free health and education services for the poor
should be lower priorities for public policy in South Asia. In fact, such programs must be an integral part
of a long-term poverty-reduction program, and would have strong long-run impacts on reducing risk and
vulnerability. Rather, the suggestion is that in the presence of uncertainty, the design of redistributive
programs, particularly of the ones that play the role of safety nets, should explicitly take into account the
importance of reducing volatility in the context of their immediate impact. An overall public expenditure
policy operating under a hard budget constraint must take into account the impact of "risk" expenditures
that target volatility, and "non-risk" expenditures that provide transfer benefits independent of shocks,
and decide on the optimal mix. The country-specific factors that would determine the optimal mix would
include, just to mention a few, the nature and extent of risk and vulnerability, the share of transitory
poverty in total poverty, and the extent of inequality prevailing in the country.
Finally, it should be noted that while public safety nets like public works and targeted transfers can
provide risk and welfare benefits in the absence of inadequately functioning financial markets in the short
run, the long-term path to welfare improvement would lie in correcting imperfections in the credit and
insurance markets. Holzmann (1990) uses a welfare-based measure to evaluate the distributive effects of
public expenditure programs, which suggest that, in general, the welfare effects from public programs
whose aim is to eliminate market constraints are greater than those that can be achieved through
interpersonal income distribution.23 Simply put, this is because market imperfections hurt lower income
groups disproportionately, with the result that the welfare effects of reducing such constraints would tend
to dominate those potentially achieved through a more equal income distribution across the cross-section
of the population.
Elimination of market constraints, particularly in capital markets, can be achieved through institutional
reforms, including liberalization of the financial sector along with the creation of regulatory mechanisms,
which promote transparency. Creating the right regulatory environment would involve establishing
rigorous accounting standards and disclosure requirements, backed by institutions to supervise and
enforce the regulations. These measures would help reduce information problems and mitigate perverse
incentives, factors that limit participation and often lead to market failures in formal credit and insurance
markets. Correcting market imperfections through these policies would induce privately provided
instruments for risk management, as well as create conditions for publicly provided formal instruments
like unemployment and health insurance.
Although the discussion so far in this section has provided the rationale for public intervention in social
protection, this should not be interpreted to mean that direct public expenditure for the provision of
services would be the only way to go, especially in credit and insurance markets. The landscape of South
Asia is dotted with failures of government programs of subsidized credit and insurance, mainly because
the information problems that limit private participation also tend to make government programs
unsustainable. In fact, in some cases, certain elements of government support like promises of bailout of
insuring companies, and loan write-offs exacerbate the problems by distorting the incentives of both
private providers and clients. The paper will thus argue that government support in insurance and credit
should largely involve nurturing and providing institutional support to innovative mechanisms like
microfinance that seek to circumvent information problems by the use of informal networks on the one
hand, and undertaking financial and regulatory reform to promote private participation on the other.
Upcoming chapters will attempt to lay out in more detail the specific areas of potential government role.
Towards a Strategy for Reducing Vulnerability in South Asia
An effective social protection strategy that acts directly on the dimension of vulnerability can go a long
way towards breaking the vicious cycle of poverty and vulnerability. As developed by Holzmann and
Jorgensen (1999), the strategy incorporates three elements - risk reduction, risk mitigation and risk
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coping. Risk reduction refers to measures that aim to reduce the probability that a shock will occur.
Public action in this sphere would mainly take the form of actions taken at the community or macro level.
For example, a sound macroeconomic policy can reduce the chance of an inflationary shock, public health
policy can reduce the possibility of an epidemic and infrastructure can prevent potential flooding. As
mentioned before, social protection and poverty alleviation are overlapping, interacting concerns in South
Asia. Thus, apart from the fact that all policies that promote growth and increase incomes would by
themselves reduce risk, programs like land reforms that alleviate poverty and promote equality can also
have less obvious impacts on risk-mitigation. For example, reducing inequality can actually promote
informal group-based insurance, by decreasing the chance of groups collapsing, and reducing the
prevalence of patron-client relationships that exploit poor clients.24
Addressing vulnerability explicitly will call for an additional focus on strategies to mitigate and cope with
risk. Risk mitigation would aim at ex ante measures that reduce the impact of inevitable shocks,
something that households can do for instance by diversifying crops and plots, combining farm and non-
farm sources of income, developing buffer stocks and so on. Group-based and public action can
encourage such anticipatory measures and also provide or upgrade the tools poor households use to insure
against risk. Public intervention, as discussed in the previous section, would be needed to address market
failures in credit and insurance markets, in order to provide access to instruments to insure against risk.
Public programs with redistribution objectives, like public works and direct transfers in the form of social
assistance, can also play the role of risk mitigation, if they are designed and targeted towards reducing the
impact of income shocks.
Valuable as risk reduction and mitigation are to social protection, many of the myriad risks to which the
poor are exposed may never be entirely elimninated. Given that reality, the overall strategy should also
provide mechanisms that enable the poor to cope with the impact of a shock after it has occurred, through
public actions like social assistance, initiating crisis-related workfare programs to provide emergency
income and cash transfers. Such measures, if they are credible to poor households in terns of availability
during times of need, can also serve as valuable tools of risk-mitigation.
Such a framework for a social protection strategy, incorporating mechanisms for risk reduction,
mitigation and coping is entirely consistent with the approach laid out in the Social Protection Sector
Strategy paper (World Bank, 2001) for all developing countries.
Typology of Risk
This section will discuss the various elements of social protection strategy for South Asia in the context of
the typology of risks relevant to the region. The risks that affect the poor can be classified on the basis of
whether their impact occurs at the level of the household, the community, or the province or the country.
The distinction is however blurred in a large number of cases where shocks have both idiosyncratic and
covariant components. Shocks can also be distinguished on the basis of the frequency and severity of
occurrence. Consumption smoothing is more difficult with repeated calamities, because households,
having exhausted their resources in coping with the initial shock, would be even more vulnerable to those
that follow. Shocks can also differ in terns of severity, ranging from catastrophes to events that do
temporary damage.
Some Important Sources of Risk for the Poor in South Asia
Health Risk - Living and working in conditions where the risk of illness and injury is high but with little
access to reliable health care facilities, the poor face a high degree of health risk. Other kinds of risks that
disproportionately affect the poor often endanger health so that one shock sets off others concurrently. 25
Health shocks reduce the income-earning capacity of poor households, with devastating consequences
especially in households with only one earning member. Using ICRISAT data for households in central
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India, Kochar (1995) finds that while labor income is an effective method of insurance against most
idiosyncratic shocks for poor households, it is ineffective as far as health shocks are concerned.
Covariant health risks like epidemics can affect a community, region or an entire country, and affect the
poor the most. Epidemics are frequently associated with multiple shocks, since they are often the direct
consequence of drought or flooding. Since individual households and even communities cannot insure
against and cope with epidemics, public intervention is necessary not only in coping with the shocks ex
post, but also to reduce the chance of their occurrence.
Harvest Risk - Protection against harvest risks that can arise from drought, plant disease, pestilence and
other causes, requires access to technologies like irrigation, pesticides, and disease-resistant varieties of
seeds, which poorer farmers often lack. Household responses to such risks typically include strategies
like reducing consumption, seeking out alternative sources of income and borrowing.26 In general, the
rich are much better able to insure themselves against such risks ex ante by diversifying among different
sources of income. As discussed before, since the downside risk of crop failure affects the poor
disproportionately, they are more likely to adopt less risky, low-return technologies, which further
perpetuate their poverty.
While harvest risks do have an idiosyncratic element, most truly disastrous shocks are likely to be
covariant, since things like drought, flood and pestilence typically hit entire communities. In the face of
such shocks, individual smoothing strategies are powerless, and informal group-based arrangements break
down, necessitating emergency public action. Again, the role of public action should not be limited to
coping with the aftermath of such shocks, but also be geared towards reducing the chance of occurrence
of such events, as well as mitigating the impact of such shocks when they inevitably do occur.
Related to harvest risk, food-price risk especially affects the poor who are net food buyers. Food prices
are naturally related to success or failure of harvests, and thus food-price and harvest risks are often
covariant. The less land a household owns, the more likely the household is to be a net food buyer and to
be affected by food price risk. Small farmers who often engage in seasonal switching from roles as net
sellers after the harvest to net buyers at other times are also likely to be affected to be food price risk,
since they would sell when food is relatively plentiful and buy when it is scarce. In response to food price
shocks, the poor often have to restrict their consumption during lean times to the point that they
experience major and lasting effects on their health and productive ability.
Labor Market Risk - The poor are also exposed to a high degree of labor market risk. When layoffs
occur in the formal sector in urban areas, the poor, who are likely to be the ones with low skills, tend to
lose their jobs first, swelling the ranks of the urban poor in the informal sector. Loss of employment in
the urban sector can occur on a large scale during covariant economic shocks like the East Asian crisis.
The crisis had less effect in South Asia, but the formal sector in the region is still vulnerable to future
economic shocks. Shocks that affect the urban formal sector also have spillover effects on the informal
sector, an example of which was Indonesia during the East Asian crisis - laid off workers crowded the
urban informal sectors reducing incomes.
Workers employed in the informal sector are exposed to even higher degrees of risk, since they have little
or no job security, and the demand for labor can vary widely. Since such workers have very low incomes,
even relatively small shocks to employment and wages can have profound effects. Such a decline in
demand for labor also affects rural households, many of which depend on the earnings of family members
who work in urban areas.
Special Risks for Vulnerable Groups -- Even among the poor, certain groups like children, the elderly,
widows, the chronically ill and the disabled are frequently cited (in consultations with the poor) as
27
especially vulnerable, primarily because they are dependent on the aid of others. Women as a group are
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identified as among the most vulnerable, because of factors like social norms, lirnited access to labor
markets and low decision-making power within households (Box 1.2). Children are also especially
vulnerable - being often underweight, poor children are susceptible to irreversible harm from further
declines in consumption as a result of a shock. In Bangladesh, children's growth was adversely affected
by major floods, whereas in rural India, rainfall shortages increased child mortality rates, and the increase
was more for landless households than for households with land.28 The elderly poor also are subject to a
high degree of risk. Unlike the non-poor, who may be able to fall back on accumulated assets as they age,
the elderly poor almost always rely on transfers from family members. Studies suggest that the motive of
old age insurance provides some explanation for high fertility and preference for sons among poor
households, revealed in gender differences in investments in education and health made by poor parents
in South Asia.29 Any policy strategy to address old-age security must be premised on knowledge of
traditional mechanisms, like intergenerational transfers.
Box 1.2: Vulnerability of Women
Women in poor households in South Asia are especially vulnerable in a number of ways. Women in households
with adult males are vulnerable because of little decision-making power, often having very little say in decisions
about how household assets would be used, especially during times of crisis. Consequently household decisions
may not take enough cognizance of the women's needs and contingencies during times of crisis. Even when
women do have some control over productive assets there may be gender differences. In Pakistan, women raise
smaller livestock like chicken and goats, while men usually raise cattle. During times of crisis the smaller
livestock get sold first. Cultural factors play a role too. In some areas of India, where women have their meals
after everybody else in the household, women are left with virtually no food during times of shortage.
Studies have shown that women often suffer more from adverse shocks than men. In India, rising food prices
led to larger reductions in nutrient intake for women than for men (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1990). There is also
evidence for pro-male bias in household health and nutrition expenditures, and a recent study found limited
evidence that in Pakistan, such bias increases as incomes fall (Alderman and Gertler, 1997). Also, female-
headed households, and especially those with children who are too young to work or take care of themselves are
particularly vulnerable. A study in Pakistan in 1993 has shown that such households may have fewer work
options, lower incomes and low labor power. Cultural factors can also affect the livelihood of divorced or
widowed women in South Asia - such women are often denied access to their late husband's property. For such
reasons women in rural Bangladesh place great value in ownership of homesteads which would provide them
with the collateral for loans, which are important to them for productive enterprises, as well as for providing
security in case of contingencies like widowhood, desertion by husbands, divorces and so on. The fact that most
of them feel that they cannot work outside their homes for wage labor makes it all the more important for them
to acquire assets like homestead.
Source: Voices of the Poor, Volume I, World Bank, 1999
Social Risk - Like the poor elsewhere, the poor in South Asia are also exposed to a high degree of social
risk, crime and domestic violence for instance. Since poor urban areas are more crime-prone than better-
off areas, the urban poor are vulnerable to the risk of crime. Crime leads to destruction of social capital,
weakens informal ties within a community and contributes to a sense of insecurity. Studies have also
shown the poor to be more vulnerable to domestic violence than those who are well off, since economic
stress often contributes to such violence.
Covariant Risks - A wide range of covariant risks at the community, country or international level
menace the poor. Natural disasters like earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and droughts, which affect entire
regions, can also be directly responsible for health, harvest and food price risks. Country-level economic
shocks arising from balance of payment, currency or financial crises affect all sections of the population,
but more so the poor by reducing their already low purchasing power or throwing them out of work. The
poor are especially vulnerable to the risk of inflation; dynamic changes in the economy, like technological
changes that result in redundancy of skills, or movements in terms of trade all carry with them risk for the
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vulnerable who are unable to make quick adjustments. Wars, terrorism, civil strife and riots, affecting
some countries in South Asia (e.g. parts of Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan), can lead to a high degree of
social risk especially for the poor whose livelihood and sense of security are among the first to be
threatened. Political instability, besides possibly causing economic instability, can also undermine law
and order and increase crime risks. The process of development itself can give rise to uncertainties and
risks of a different sort. Resettlement of entire communities for development projects can uproot the poor
and threaten their livelihoods. Environmental degradation in the form of pollution and deforestation
poses risks to health and livelihoods.30
From the discussion so far it is apparent that the poor are exposed to risks from a broad range of factors.
It will be useful to summarize the discussion so far in a table that attempts to organize the various sources
of risk, while also drawing attention to the type of risk associated with each of these sources. Table 1.1 is
an attempt in that direction, by way of a two-way classification of risks, in terms of sources as well as
types. The sources of risk summarized in Table 1.1 call for a broad range of strategies for social
protection, classified into risk reducing, risk mitigation and risk coping strategies. Table 1.2 considers
various risk reducing options, and attempts to link each one of them to the various sources of risk
identified in Table 1.1. As mentioned before, the instruments to reduce risk would also, in most cases,
qualify as policies aimed at promoting growth, strengthening human capital and reducing poverty. A
comprehensive social protection strategy should however go beyond these policies, and seek to develop
mechanisms to mitigate and cope with risks, in some cases by supplanting costly adjustments, and
sometimes by utilizing and extending the existing informal networks.
Table 1.3 matches options for risk mitigation and coping with different sources of risk. While some are
essential elements of broad-based policies to reduce poverty and promote income and growth, what sets
them apart is the fact that each one can directly impact vulnerability from specific sources. Tables 1.2
and 1.3 are not, however, exhaustive lists of possible instruments, nor are the listed impacts the only
possible impacts. The objective is rather to focus on instruments that could be important in the context of
South Asia, as well as the observed and potential effects of such strategies on risk and vulnerability.
Moreover, the strategies listed here offer a broad gamut of measures, encompassing areas of public action
as well as interventions that are primarily community-driven (where government can play only indirect
roles).
Some of the instruments for risk mitigation and coping listed in Table 1.3, that are particularly relevant to
South Asia, will be discussed in upcoming Chapter III, with special attention to each instrument's role in
the rubric of social protection, and outlining the principles for improving their performance. Given the
inadequacy of existing options, it will be imperative to expand risk mitigating and coping options, both in
terms of extending coverage and addressing vulnerability better; Chapter IV will consider some
innovative directions in which such expansion can be attempted. Even before considering existing
options for social protection, one should stress the need to target the vulnerability of those who are at
special risk, even among the poor, requiring specific kinds of intervention. Among the most important of
such groups, in South Asian context, are widows and working children; Chapter II discusses how their
vulnerability is targeted by current policy, and suggests options for the future. Finally, Chapter V draws
from the discussion in previous chapters, and the framework laid out in the current chapter, to suggest
broad guidelines for a social protection strategy, at the regional level as well as individual country level.
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Table 1.1: Sources and Types of Risk
Idiosyncratic 4 - Covariant
Sources of Risk Micro: Meso: Village/ Macro: National/
+ Household Community International
Natural Disasters
Earthquake, flood, drought, hurricane T
Landslide, flash flood
Health
Epidemics like malaria, AIDS, etc. -1
Illness, injury, disability, old age
Economic
Economic recession
Devaluation, technology or trade
induced change in relative prices
Labor market risk: unemployment,
redundancy of skills
Harvest failure and food price risk
Social / Security Related
Civil strife, riots, terrorism, war
Crime, domestic violence
Development Related
Environmental: pollution, deforestation
Resettlement
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Table 1.2: Policy Instruments for Risk Reduction
Sources of Spreading Public Health, Labor Standards, Education Access to Sound Macro- Transparency in Redistribution,
Risk Awareness Safe Water & Workplace & Training Agro economic Decision e.g. Land
+ Sanitation Safety Technology Policy making Reform
Natural l
Disasters
Epidemics _ _
Illness, V i
disability
Old age
Economic i i
crises
Labor
market risk
Harvest i '
failure,
food price
Crime& 4 i
violence
Environ-
mental
Resettle- V
ment
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Table 1.3: Instruments for Risk Mitigation and Coping: Public, Market-Based and Informal
Sources of Workfare Targeted Transfers: Community- Formal Market-Based Instruments Saving Instruments Property Medical,
Risk Including Social based Rights Public
Assistance to Instruments: Health & Crop Social Formal Informal Health
Elderly & Widows Microfinance & Unemployment Insurance Security & Market- Group-
Insurance Insurance Pensions Based Based
Natural V l l l
Disasters
Epidemics i _
Illness, V i i V l l
disability
Old age, V l v V
widowhood
Economic i
crises
Labor market
risk
Harvest failure l V V V V V
and food price
Crime and l
violence
War, Civil V V V
Strife
Environmental V V V
Resettlement l
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II. Targeting the Vulnerable: Widows and Working Children
In varying degrees vulnerability is universal. Still, an effective strategy to address risk must
identify those who are most vulnerable. Gender, age - children and the elderly - or widowhood
can serve as identifiers of groups whose members are especially vulnerable to shocks, both
idiosyncratic and covariant, which may drive them to destitution or trap them in long-term
poverty. As discussed in Chapter One, for various reasons women as a group are identified
among the most vulnerable, and among women, widows are especially at risk. Old-age security,
a matter of special concern, is addressed explicitly in the context of pension reform later. This
chapter focuses on two of the most vulnerable groups, widows and working children, both of
them especially important in South Asia, and seeks to understand the extent and source of their
vulnerability and to explore the special kinds of interventions required to deal with the risks they
face.
Addressing Vulnerability of Widows
Although knowledge about the condition of widows is limited by the paucity of empirical
information, informal field investigations, sociological studies and related sources suggest that
many widows in South Asia live in acute deprivation and insecurity, even in households
31classified as non-poor. Widowhood is inevitable for many since women tend to outlive men,
and also because women are usually married to men who are older than they are. Surveys
conducted in India reveal that many widows are left totally destitute by the time their husbands
die. 32 Often they have sold off all their assets to pay for medicines, carry heavy debts incurred
by their husbands and frequently become the victims of unscrupulous moneylenders as well as of
family members who lay claims to their property. The risk of widowhood then is often
synonymous with the risk of losing property and source of livelihood. Addressing the
vulnerability of widows thus should include government action to create a legal environment that
protects their rights.
Existing South Asian government programs to address the economic risks of widowhood, relying
mostly on direct transfers, are highly inadequate. For example, in India, only four states -- Tamil
Nadu, Kerala, Gujarat and Orissa -- have pension schemes for destitute widows providing
extremely limited coverage, with average amounts of transfers too low to make much difference
to the economic status of even those who are covered.33 A typical case is that of Tamil Nadu's
pension scheme, which targets destitute widows above the age of 40 with average transfers that
are less than 10 percent of poverty-line income. A review of this scheme finds the application
process for assistance to be extremely demanding in terms of time, travel, expenses and document
requirements, compounded by an often arbitrary and lengthy enquiry process, as well as long
delays before payments start, even after eligibility has been determined. The high opportunity
costs and minimal assistance often discourages intended beneficiaries from seeking state
pensions, detracting from the scheme's functioning as a safety net.34
While government efforts have the potential advantage of extended outreach, to be able to
mitigate risks such programs must be easily accessible and efficiently targeted - characteristics
that future efforts at program design should ensure. Government programs should also focus on
providing access to financial instruments like saving and insurance to mitigate risks, and create a
legal environment to protect the rights of widows. Inheritance laws to protect the property rights
of widows should be enacted and enforced, along with campaigns to promote awareness of the
laws. In most countries of the region, such laws exist but awareness of them is low and the
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relevant law-enforcement institutions are often neither very accessible nor sensitive to the needs
of widows.
Grassroots organizations can play an important role in providing insurance and legal protection
for widows, as shown by the experiences of SEWA in India and the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) (Box 2.1). 35 Given the limitations of existing government
pension schemes and the likelihood that most South Asian governments will be unable to finance
adequate pension schemes in the foreseeable future, grassroots efforts like these should be
explored as models that can be replicated elsewhere with necessary adaptations, while steps are
taken to ensure financial sustainability. Insurance that women can purchase in anticipation of
widowhood is one of many products that microfinance and other forms of community-based
efforts can provide, as discussed later, against a variety of risks the poor must face.
Box 2.1: Community-Based Efforts in Addressing the Vulnerability of Widows
SEWA has been a model of how poor women can organize themselves for change and economic
independence. Among its programs are those aimed to assist not only widowed members, but to prepare all
women for widowhood. Since 1994 SEWA members have been able to insure against their husband's
deaths for a small premium, which provides assistance with funeral expenses and a lump sum or a regular
pension. Besides providing various forms of support through its network of women, SEWA also offers
legal help against exploitation and property appropriation.
In Bangladesh, BRAC has been training paralegals drawn from the women themselves to provide legal help
to widows in many of the villages where BRAC projects are in place. For example, for 200 widows in
Maniganj district, the paralegal is a young widow named Ishrat. The women go to her at the first signs of
trouble, often disputes with the deceased husband's family over land. Although under Muslim law a
woman is entitled to half her brother's portion of her father's estate, and an eighth of her husband's estate,
in practice she rarely receives her due. Sometimes widows find themselves evicted from their homes, with
even their children forcibly taken away. Ishrat works to achieve a just settlement of the disputes, initially
by just confronting the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff for his alleged offenses. If this tactic does not
work she would represent the widow at the village council. If all else fails, she would ask the BRAC legal
office to bring the matter to the courts. Her activities in challenging a male-dominated establishment have
often become big news in the area, making people aware of the rights of widows. The contribution of
Ishrat and other paralegals in BRAC villages has to be measured in terms of this information aspect in
addition to the security they provide to widows.
Source: "Widows Banding Together", by Margaret Owen (1995) in People and Planet, Vol. 4, No.3
Reducing the Incidence and Risks of Child Labor36
The incidence of child labor is attributed largely to the poverty and vulnerability of households.
Vulnerability plays an important role, as is evident from numerous studies that have documented
children being removed from school and sent to work in response to shocks or seasonal falls in
income. These suggest that along with poverty reducing measures, strategies that explicitly seek
to mitigate risks faced by poor households are likely to reduce child work. Reducing child labor
in turn would in turn have a beneficial impact on poverty and vulnerability in the long run, since
work that keeps children away from school affects their long term development and productive
potential, perpetuating poverty and vulnerability. Quite apart from these numerous tangible ill
effects of child labor, the prevalence of child labor in South Asia is a matter of great concern
from a social, ethical and welfare point of view, and a comprehensive strategy is imperative to
address this phenomenon.
It is also important to realize that vulnerability is not the only factor responsible for the
prevalence of child labor. A number of factors, like lack of availability of quality education, the
fact that the training a child receives at work is sometimes perceived by parents to be more
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valuable than the low perceived returns of formal education, as well as social and cultural factors,
may play important roles under different conditions. Keeping the broad range of factors in mind,
a strategy to reduce child labor must adopt a holistic approach, combining social protection
measures that seek to reduce the need for child work by reducing vulnerability, with other
elements like community-based campaigns, providing schooling incentives, developing
alternative schooling programs for children compelled to work for economic reasons, and
enacting and enforcing appropriate legislation. Since reducing child labor would need a range of
measures broader than social protection interventions, the discussion in this section will not be
limited to explicit measures to reduce vulnerability, and instead outline the important elements of
a holistic strategy to tackle the problem.
Figure 4
Workforce Participation Rates of Children in Selected
South Asian Countries
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For children of age 5-14 for Bangladesh, India and Nepal, and for those of age 10-14 for
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The lack of availability of standardized data makes comparisons across
countries difficult. (The charts are based on work by Rie Hiraoka, SASHP, World Bank, 2000)
South Asia is home to the largest number of working children in the world. Although estimating
the extent of child labor is a difficult exercise, even conservative estimates suggest that there are
some 20-30 million children at work in the region's five large countries, where sizeable
proportions of children in all countries except Sri Lanka appear to be engaged in the workforce
(Figures 4 and 5). Agriculture has the major share of child employment, absorbing two-thirds of
working children in Pakistan and Bangladesh and three-fourths in India. While a sizable
proportion of these children work on family farms, a large number are also agricultural wage
laborers. Urban child workers are more likely to be engaged in hazardous work in the informal
sectors. In Bangladesh, nearly 70 percent of urban child workers work outside the family
enterprise, including hazardous occupations in manufacturing or domestic service. Average
hours of work are higher in urban areas, and often children are employed as forced labor in the
brick-kiln industry or carpet manufacturing. In Pakistan 11 percent of children are employed in
manufacturing, including hazardous industries such as carpet and brick making. In India, child
labor is found to be growing rapidly in urban areas, from 5.5 percent of the total amount of child
labor in 1961 to 10 percent in 1991, with potentially hazardous sectors like manufacturing,
transport, storage and communications sectors being large employers of child labor.
Correlates of Child Labor
Evidence from different countries indicates that vulnerability of the poor is an important factor
pushing children into work and exploitative conditions. Ray (1999) finds that when a Pakistani
household falls into poverty, its children's involvement in outside, paid employment is
substantially increased at the expense of schooling, with the reduction in schooling being
comparatively larger for girls. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) found evidence of children being
withdrawn from school as a response to seasonal shocks to household incomes in six villages in
semi-arid regions of India. Evidence from Bangladesh shows that 67 percent of children work on
account of economic hardship either to contribute labor for wages to supplement or smooth
household incomes, or to work at home so that adults can work outside. These findings suggest
that due to the absence of mechanisms to mitigate risk, wider involvement of children in the labor
market is often used as a strategy to insure against transitory economic hardship like the loss of a
job or illness.
A number of other factors are also responsible for the existence of child labor. Given high
unemployment rates in most of the countries in the region, parents may perceive a child's current
income to be preferable to the uncertain prospect of future employment that education offers.
Families also often view children's work as valuable opportunities for learning vocational skills
that are valued more than traditional primary education, often regarded to be of poor quality and
relevance. Lack of food security can also create incentives for child labor. A survey in
Bangladesh found that urban working children, unlike the majority of the urban poor, are able to
afford three meals a day, a major incentive for children to seek wage employment.
Demand for child labor also plays an important role, especially in the urban sector. In
Bangladesh for example, the spurt in urban child labor in the last decade can be partly attributed
to major job creation in the export-oriented garment industry in the major cities, along with jobs
in other industries and the informal sector, an estimated 20 percent of which were taken by
children. Various indicators of human and economic development are also found to be closely
linked with the incidence of child labor.3 ' Finally, the will and ability of governments to enact
and enforce labor laws, including anti-child-labor and minimum wage laws also affect the
prevalence of child labor.
20
Public Policy and Programs
Countries in South Asia in recent years have by and large been able to enact legislation
addressing the problem of child labor, particularly in hazardous industries. Enforcement of the
laws, however, remains profoundly inadequate in all countries. A number of countries have also
adopted various schemes for the withdrawal and rehabilitation of working children under the ILO
International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC).
While a number of pure government initiatives exist to address the issue of child labor (e.g. the
National Child Labor Projects in India, targeted to select hazardous industries, and the Food for
Education Program in Bangladesh), partnerships between the government, NGOs and the private
sector deserve special attention as innovative initiatives in the region. In Bangladesh, the
BGMEA3 8 program in the Ready Made Garment sector successfully created the first-ever
partnership of the industry, ILO, UNICEF, NGOs and the Government to address the root causes
of child labor. Also in Bangladesh, the Basic Education for Hard to Reach Urban Children
program aims to alleviate exploitative child labor by providing basic education for 351,000
working children in 6 major cities of Bangladesh by the Year 2000, implemented through
learning centers run by NGOs with emphasis on community participation and accountability. In
Pakistan, the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry in partnership with some international
organizations and NGOs is engaged in a project since 1997 to eliminate child labor from the local
soccer ball industry. The project involves prevention and monitoring, along with non-formal
education, skills training, income generation activities for adults and a savings and loan scheme.
Box 2.2: Community-Based Anti-Child Labor Initiatives in India
CREDA is an NGO working in the Mirzapur district of Uttar Pradesh for the last 15 or more years,
identified in 1992 as a credible partner and implementing agency for ILO. CREDA started its initial
campaign against the employment of child labor in two blocks identified as high concentration areas for
child labor engaged in the carpet industry in Allahabad and Mirzapur districts. To begin with, CREDA
provided facilities for free medical check-up for working children in 15 villages. This was followed by
non-formal education classes after working hours, and then an awareness campaign at four contact centers,
which became the nucleus for all future CREDA efforts. CREDA's strategy in its campaign against
employing children involved all stakeholders of the carpet industry including loom owners and carpet
manufacturers, relied heavily on community mobilization through face to face contact with individuals and
groups, and involved activists from villages who were keen to work with CREDA as volunteers. These
efforts were collectively responsible for creating a climate in which the elimination of child labor was
largely possible in 25 villages, while preserving the industry; these villages continue to have looms, but
with only adults working on them. Another NGO in India, the M. Venkatrangaiah Foundation (MVF) has
undertaken several programs to reduce child labor in the Ranga Reddy district of Andhra Pradesh,
particularly with regard to girl children and bonded laborers. Their strategy involves intensive advocacy in
the community by forming parents' and village level committees, and focusing particularly on the family
and the child. After convincing the family to withdraw the child from work, the MVF first enrolls the child
in a non-formal bridge course whose duration depends on the needs of the child; on completion of the
course the child is enrolled in a regular school. In spite of facing resistance from the employers of children
in factories, MVF was able to set up a dialogue with all the stakeholders and substantially reduce child
labor in the Kattedan Industrial Area of Ranga Reddy district. The special role of MVF has been to
successfully draw various stakeholders like communities, parents, the children, employers and trade unions
into their efforts, as well as the ability to network with the state enforcement machinery for the
implementation of child labor laws.
These efforts have demonstrated the importance of being able to engage stakeholders and encourage them
in taking ownership of the program in order for any intervention to succeed.
Source: Sector work by SASHD, the World Bank on situational analyses of child labor in India (2000).
A number of purely NGO driven efforts have also been successful in the region, examples of
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which include the cases of two NGOs in India addressing the child labor issue by involving
communities and encouraging stakeholders to assume ownership of the programs (Box 2.2).
Most such programs in the region are limited in their scope and coverage. 39 There are two major
long-term challenges that a broader solution must face - how to achieve cost-effectiveness with
programs such as these, and how to replicate them on a broader scale for increased impact.
Broad Guidelines for Reducing Child Labor
Strategies adopted in South Asian countries have mostly taken a partial approach, operating
mainly through isolated programs aimed at working children in specific occupations and areas.
While such efforts are important, a long-term solution to the problem lies in a holistic, multi-
dimensional approach that treats child labor as one aspect of a broad social protection strategy,
recognizing the complex nature of the problem and the complementarity between short-term
measures to rehabilitate working children, and long term strategy to remove the incentives that
favor child labor, through risk-mitigation and poverty reduction. Complementary measures
would create social awareness about the value of education for children, provide access to
education of relevance and quality and build a consensus for the enforcement of laws. While the
ultimate goal should be total elimination of child labor, a more incremental short-run approach
would first aim at protecting and rehabilitating children who are already working. The strategy
would also need to involve the community in planning, implementation and monitoring of all
programs to encourage complete community ownership. While the guidelines described below
are broad enough to be applicable to the entire region, a detailed policy strategy would need to be
country-specific, informed by conditions and capacities in individual countries.
Enforcement of existing legislation banning the most hazardous or unethical form of child labor,
examples of which in the context of South Asia range from prostitution and bonded labor to the
use of children in militia, is imperative. While all South Asian countries have enacted such
legislation, the capacity to enforce must improve dramatically in most countries. An enabling
environment for enforcing such legislation, as well as support for programs to reduce child labor,
can be created by raising social awareness about the ills of child labor and the value of education
for the child. In certain cases where severe forms of exploitation of child labor exist, bonded
labor being one example, awareness can be created only through empowerment of vulnerable
groups.
Reducing poverty and vulnerability is the long-run solution to the child labor problem. In this
context, the role of policy should not be limited to promoting long-term improvement in the poor
households' resource base and productive capacity and must include intervention to improve the
ability of poor households to manage risk, by making available alternative mechanisms for risk
mitigation, so that they do not have to rely on child labor to insure against income shocks.
Various safety net measures like public works programs and provision of credit and insurance and
saving would be able to perform this role.
The situation in most South Asian countries would also warrant a gradual approach, making an
initial mix of labor and schooling attractive to the household. Ravallion and Wodon (2000) found
that the enrollment subsidy provided by the Food for Education program in Bangladesh had large
positive effects on enrollment but a much smaller (negative) effect on the incidence of child
labor, suggesting that poor families often find combinations of child labor and schooling to be
more attractive than a dichotomous choice between child labor or schooling. While the gradual
approach may not lead to an appreciable decrease in child work in the short run, it would avoid
interventions of the kind that leave the child worse off, and complement the long term strategy
outlined above. The gradual approach should (a) rather than prohibiting all forms of child labor,
impose restrictions consistent with enforcement capacity; (b) encourage children compelled to
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work for economic reasons - through flexible schooling hours and informal, transitional
education programs - to combine work and school, as in certain successful programs in the
region; (c) transfer resources to households with working children, sometimes targeting services
like health care and education services through the children themselves.
Policies also need to take into account possible short-run tradeoffs. For example, programs
providing productive loans in order to lift households out of poverty may have the short-run
effect of diverting children from school to work in household enterprises. In such cases,
schooling or enrollment incentives in the form of subsidies for books, uniforms and meals, will
help to negate the short-run effects on child labor. Since women constitute a large share of the
entrepreneurs in such programs in South Asia, girl children are more likely to be taken out of
school to work at home, calling for targeting incentives especially towards girl children.
Strategies should actively involve communities. This can often be achieved by inviting
participation of NGOs and CBOs, whose knowledge at the community level can help in
identifying child labor, mobilizing community support and awareness, and encouraging
stakeholders to take ownership of the programs. Such institutions are also likely to be best
equipped to undertake participatory or action research to pilot strategies, and in tailoring
educational programs to fit the specific needs of working children.
Finally, it is essential to address the existing gaps in knowledge about child labor issues, largely
due to the lack of reliable and detailed data. Census data in each country should provide reliable
measures of child labor, to form the basis for household surveys concentrating on sectors/areas
with high incidence of child labor, to collect more detailed information on factors behind child
labor. Such data would induce empirical analysis to identify where interventions need to occur,
how incentives need to be corrected and what targeting devices are most effective. Without
information of this kind the precise area and mode of policy intervention will be hard to ascertain,
and strategies - holistic or otherwise - may prove profoundly off base.
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1II. Evaluating Existing Options for Risk Mitigation and Coping
Normal poverty-reducing interventions in the areas of health and education remain important as
long-term measures for mitigating the risk of being poor. Improving income diversification
opportunities especially for rural areas, through improved extension services and access to credit
are also elements of a long-term poverty reduction strategy that will contribute towards mitigating
risk. These changes can however take place only in the long run, which creates the need for more
immediate measures that mitigate risk.
In South Asia the most effective responses to the vulnerability of the poor will flow from each
country's characteristics, needs and institutional capability and reflect the considerable variety of
the important sources of risk within the region.40 That said, there are certain areas of social
protection in all countries where governments have important roles to play, and have historically
done so. These include public works programs, which provide livelihood security to the poor,
and targeted transfers of various kinds that mitigate some risks faced by the most vulnerable
groups, including widows and the elderly. In the absence of formal insurance, such programs are
important instruments for risk mitigation and coping, and most countries in the region have had
substantial experience with at least one such program.
As mentioned in Chapter L the rationale for government intervention through these programs is
mainly to do with redistribution, with the goal of achieving equity and welfare for the needy.
Market failures in credit and insurance markets that result in very limited risk management
opportunities for the poor, would mean that such redistributive programs could provide
significant welfare benefits if they were aligned towards reducing the volatility of income and
consumption flows. The discussion that follows attempts to review some of the existing
programs from the point of view of the risk benefits they provide, and suggest some broad
principles for their success. Public works and direct targeted transfers are considered important
in this context because firstly, they have a long history of existence in some of the countries and
at least in some cases, have achieved a measure of success; secondly, they are commonly used
instruments that experience has shown to be implementable in developing countries with limited
institutional capabilities.
Public Works Programs
In low-income countries like those in South Asia, public works programs or workfare programs
that require participants to work to obtain benefits play an important role as safety nets. They
confer stabilization benefits by smoothing consumption in periods of high unemployment, as well
as confer transfer benefits to the poor. The utility of workfare programs can extend to cases of
aggregate or covariant shocks as well if they are adapted to respond to times of crisis, such as
macroeconomic shocks, natural disasters or large-scale harvest failures when a large number of
able-bodied people lose jobs and livelihood.41 To the extent that such programs can provide
employment in the aftermath of a shock, they provide a means to cope with risk. To the extent
they can inspire confidence in the target population about availability and effectiveness after a
crisis strikes, they also perform the role of risk mitigation.
The inadequacy of available data makes it difficult to assess the impact of many public works
programs and especially to evaluate their risk benefits. Some studies, however, have
demonstrated the large risk benefits of a good workfare program during famines (examples found
in Ravallion, 1997), which would be present during more normal times also. The extent of risk
benefits that safety net programs generate depends on how flexibly the program responds to
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changing household circumstances. Workfare programs can show such flexibility provided the
work is easily obtained when needed; that in turn will depend on the wage rates, the scheme's
budget, the labor intensity of the work and the eligibility requirements.
The extent of benefits generated by a workfare program would depend on the program features
(like wage structure, timing and duration), design features (like the institutional framework and
the type of implementing agencies) and sustainability. Targeting is an important determinant of
benefits and cost effectiveness.42 Wage rate and structure can help in targeting - maintaining the
program wage at a level no higher than the prevailing market wage for unskilled labor may
induce self-selection by the poor into the program; piece-wage payments or wages in kind can
help attract vulnerable groups like women into the program. Crucial program features also
include the timing and duration of employment - a program operated intensively during the
agricultural off-peak season can provide consumption-smoothing benefits, even if transfer
benefits per poor person are quite low. For a program to be able to mitigate risk, it should ideally
guarantee availability of employment during times of need to anyone willing to work at the
prevailing wage. The benefits generated by a particular program are also dependent on the
program's design features, like implementing agencies and the institutional framework that often
determine the extent to which the poor have to bear transactions costs or costs arising out of
corruption.
Among public works programs in South Asia, programs in Bangladesh and India have been
especially important both in terms of time and scale of operation. The discussion focuses on
them, noting that the broad overlap in the experiences and conditions among most countries gives
their design and performance a measure of region-wide significance. The programs in other
countries, like Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Nepal have been more short-lived as well as limited in
43terms of coverage.
Bangladesh: Foodfor Work (FFW) and Test Relief (TR) Programs44
Bangladesh is exposed to a high degree of risk from natural sources like floods, stonns and
harvest failure. Public works programs can play an important part in efforts to combat
vulnerability from such covariant risks, as well as risks that are more idiosyncratic in nature.
Since its inception following the 1974 famine, FFW has become a large part of Bangladesh's
rural public works program. Around 1981-82, the program had an annual capacity to provide
more than 100 million man-days of employment, equivalent to at least 17 days of additional
employment for every landless worker in the country.45 In FFW projects, activities are
undertaken during the dry season (mid-December through mid-May).46
Studies have shown that most programs included in the umbrella of FFW programs are relatively
well-targeted, possibly because wages paid in terms of wheat, considered an inferior grain in
Bangladesh, and kept below the prevailing agricultural wage induce self-selection. A large
proportion of participants were also found to live near the project sites and name agricultural
labor as their primary occupation, indicating that they regard FFW programs as intended - a
source of remunerative employment during the agricultural slack season. By generating wage
employment during the February-May period, the slack agricultural season, FFW programs
directly impact vulnerability by reducing seasonal joblessness.
India: Maharashtra's Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) and Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY)
Introduced in 1972 in the state of Maharashtra, EGS has been described by UNDP's Human
Development Report (1993) as one of the largest public programs in the developing world. The
program guarantees employment to all adults above the age of 18 who are willing to provide
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unskilled manual labor on a piece-rate basis. Employment in the scheme, provided year-round
but more intensively during agricultural slack seasons, increased from 4.5 million person-days in
1973 to about 148 million person-days in 1993. 47 By offering below-market wages, EGS seeks
to induce self-selection by the poor. Until 1988, the wage rate was equal to the minimum wage,
but lower than the prevailing peak season agricultural market wage for unskilled labor, but in
1988 minimum and EGS wages doubled, and both exceeded the market wage rates. The wage
hike may have reduced the program's self-targeting ability, though there is no clear evidence to
support this claim.
There is evidence that stabilization benefits of EGS are quite significant. Stabilization benefits
are created by relatively high EGS employment in the lean agricultural season (April to July)
compared to the peak season (October to January). Landless labor households in two villages
where EGS has operated since 1977 had about 50 percent less variable income streams than those
in a village where employment guarantee schemes were not available.48 Even though the transfer
benefits of the program declined following the wage hike in 1988, as evidenced by a sharp fall in
total number of person days of employment caused at least partly by job rationing, EGS
continued to offer stabilization benefits. 9 EGS also plays the key role of risk mitigation by
providing insurance against labor market shocks and harvest failures, enabled by its credible
guarantee of work during times of need (especially until the wage rate increases of 1988 led to
job rationing) both on account of its legal commitment and its long history of successful
operation throughout the state. According to various evaluations, EGS has outperformed other
anti poverty programs in India, as well as similar programs elsewhere, on such criteria as quality
of implementation, sustainability and controlling leakage due to corruption and administrative
failure. 50 However, there remains room for improvement in administrative efficiency, reducing
leakage from corruption, delivery of services and maintenance of assets (see Box 3.1 for lessons
offered by the experience of EGS).
JRY, a countrywide scheme, was formally instituted in 1989. The program aims to alleviate
poverty by creating supplementary employment opportunities for the rural poor during
agricultural slack periods, create social assets and positively impact agricultural wages. By 1995,
JRY covered 123 underdeveloped districts of the country's 350 districts and generated around 1
billion person-days of employment annually on average between 1993-94 and 1995-96.51 Its
targeting performance, however, has been largely inefficient. In 11 out of 15 states the share of
all poor among JRY participants is below 50 percent, probably caused by the fact that the JRY
wage, always equal to the minimum wage, often turns out to be very close to or higher than the
local wage, thus detracting from self-targeting. 52
So far IRY has been much less of a success than EGS and has also been much less studied.
Available assessments suggest that monthly employment generated per participant has been on
the low side, with a median value of 4.1 days. This low level of job creation would clearly
translate into low transfer benefits, but because the program operates intensively during the
agricultural slack season, as many as 55 million persons gained employment during times of high
seasonal unemployment, possibly creating large consumption smoothing benefits. However on
the whole, the program has not performed adequately by various criteria. Participation of women
is very low and costs tend to be high, while transfer benefits are limited.
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Box 3.1: Lessons Learnt from Maharashtra's Employment Guarantee Scheme
Programs in developing countries can learn a lot from the experience of EGS, regarding elements like
employment guarantees, wage rates, sustainability of the program and the role of voluntary organizations.
Statutory Guarantee of Employment -- The guarantee of employment is central to the success of EGS. Such
a feature enhances insurance benefits to the poor and reduces the need for costly adjustments, often allows
scarce resources to go to the poorest first (albeit only to those able to work), and reduces some of the
possibilities of corruption (Ravallion et al., 1993). In addition it empowers the poor by creating a sense of
entitlement among them. The long sustained history of the program and the fact that it operates round the
year have made the guarantee credible to the poor.
Wage Rates - Evidence shows that wages have been effective for targeting purposes. However, the feature
of employment guarantee may have been undermined by the increase in wage rates in 1988, when the
average EGS wage became higher than market wages and were not accompanied by commiserate expansion
in budget. Ravallion et al found that average monthly expenditures on EGS actually fell after the increase in
wages, and employment fell by one-third, suggesting some rationing in employment. There was also a shift
in the EGS work toward activities that are paid at lower piece rates, with the effect that the real average EGS
wage increased much less than the nominal wage rate. The government denied the existence of any
rationing, and attributed the fall in employment mainly to increased demand for labor in the mainstream
sector caused by various factors. While there is some merit in that argument, the experience offers some
valuable lessons - wage rates should be consistent with budgetary resources, and a departure from that may
in fact detract from the most beneficial feature of the program.
Sustainability - Finance provided by the urban areas and universal support, particularly the support of the
rural rich, seem to be the main reason for the sustainability of the scheme in the state. The reason for this
universal popularity is that the EGS is perceived to offer something for each group. The rural rich benefit
from the assets created by the scheme, and there is widespread support among the rural poor because of the
benefits they derive. The number of beneficiaries of the program may in fact be larger than the actual
number of participants at any one date (Ravallion, 1991) - many who rarely participate still value the
scheme's insurance benefits. The key to sustainability thus lies in the ability to convince different groups
about the benefits to themselves.
Role of Voluntary Organizations - Delivery of benefits from EGS is seen to improve markedly with the
participation of voluntary organizations, as Deshpande (1988) shows in his study on Jawahar Taluka of
Thane. In this case a labor organization helped spread awareness of the scheme, mobilized labor to demand
employment from the administrators and checked malpractice and leakage to some extent. The program
itself was implemented differently in various parts of the taluka, depending on whether a labor organization
was present. The constructive role of voluntary organizations is thus another important lesson to take away
from the story of EGS.
Some Broad Principles of Success for Public Works Programs
While these large public works programs offer diverse experiences, their experiences suggest
some principles of success outlined below.
* Wage rates should be determined by the local market wage for unskilled labor. While higher
wages can have positive effect on transfer benefits, and sometimes on the market wage, these
effects must be weighed against adverse effects on targeting and employment generating
capacity of the program. Wage schedules should also be gender neutral. Certain kinds of
wage structures can facilitate participation of women, as can features like local work sites and
childcare facilities.54
* While paying wages in kind (as in FFW) is sometimes justified on the grounds of targeting
(poor workers would self-select when payment is in the form of a perceived inferior grain)
and nutritional objectives, it also has disadvantages - higher costs, not being attractive to the
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poor because of lack of flexibility are some of them - that may outweigh the advantages.
These arguments for and against wages in kind should be carefully weighed.
* Labor intensity for public works projects should be higher than the local norm for similar
projects. In this context, minimizing possible conflict between objectives of workfare
programs would be important. Evaluations of FFW have noted that the two main objectives
of short-term stabilization and building infrastructure to foster long-term development are not
always mutually consistent. Such conflicts may engender tradeoffs between high labor
intensity and efficient infrastructure investments, which need to be taken into account for
program design.
* While some benefits of the infrastructure created going to the non-poor can be good for
generating support for the program contributing to its sustainability (EGS being a successful
example), efforts should be made to protect the share of the poor in benefits. Involving
communities in project selection can enable the poor to access benefits from infrastructure.
* Risk mitigation benefits are high when there is credible availability of the program during
times of need. Making the program available at all times, expanding automatically during
crisis when demand is high (as is the case with EGS) will maximize risk mitigation. In case
of programs that operate mostly in lean seasons (JRY, FFW), a long history of successful
operation can create the credibility among the poor necessary to mitigate risk.
* Delivery of benefits, as well as cost-effectiveness can be improved by effective organization
at the local level. Briefly, this would involve strengthening local governments, building their
capacity to implement the project efficiently, increasing their accountability to local
communities, and ensuring incentive compatibility between local officials and line agencies.
Many of the shortcomings of FFW and JRY, for example, can be traced to inadequacies in
local implementing authorities.
* Closely related to above is the need to encourage the creation and participation of coalitions
of the poor that empower them, like labor unions or community-based organizations. Such
organizations can also improve accountability of implementing agencies and act as checks
against leakage from corruption and administrative malpractice. EGS has met with
considerable success with such endeavors.
* Geographic targeting could also enhance a workfare program's impact, whereby regions with
large concentrations of vulnerable groups can be identified for program allocations.
Programs like FFW in Bangladesh do not currently incorporate such elements of regional
targeting; line ministries allocate resources mainly on population criteria.
Public works programs are important policy measures to reduce vulnerability, especially in the
context of South Asian countries with large informal sectors, where the level of institutional
development limits the outreach of fonnal safety nets. It is also important, however, to remember
that public works programs do not reduce vulnerability from all sources, nor are they able to
reach such vulnerable groups as the old, the infirm and children. Other programs that target
vulnerability of the poor are thus needed as complements.
Social Protection Through Targeted Transfers in Cash or Kind
In developing countries like those of South Asia, means-tested social assistance is an important
instrument of social protection that governments can employ. Such assistance includes transfers
for the elderly, child allowances, targeted human development programs and subsidies and
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waivers for basic services. Cross-country experiences suggest that while family assistance and
targeted social assistance are effective in addressing vulnerability and reducing poverty in the
short term, finding an appropriate targeting system compatible with local administrative capacity
is difficult. A number of such programs exist in South Asian countries, some of which are
discussed below to identify the roles of the most important existing transfer arrangements, and to
suggest the place such policies could occupy in a comprehensive social protection strategy.
Cash Transfer Program in Pakistan - Zakat
In Pakistan, the principal form of cash transfers to the poor is through the publicly administered
Zakat system. Zakat can be thought of as a wealth tax of 2.5 percent on individually owned
financial assets. Zakat is paid into a central fund administered by an autonomous Zakat Council
and maintained by the State Bank of Pakistan. Some of the funds are disbursed to institutions
operating at national level, with the rest going to provincial Zakat funds to be further distributed
among local committees for payment to individuals. Those eligible to receive Zakat directly or
indirectly, include the poor (especially widows and orphans) and the handicapped.
Zakat has some positive elements - subsistence allowance seems adequate, the allowance paid in
cash makes the transfer a full income equivalent, administration costs are kept low primarily by
the voluntary inputs from the local committees, reliance on a specific source for funds ensures
sustainability, and the program has a strong re-distributive potential.55 Studies have however
concluded that the impact Zakat funds has been highly limited by the relatively low levels of
transfers and beneficiaries involved. Collections that increased steadily between 1980-81 and
1993-94 have since declined, amounting to only 0.19 percent of GDP by 1992-93; this implies
that even if all the benefits had gone to the lowest quintile of households, the income of this
group would have been augmented by only 2 percent.56 Evidence on targeting efficiency is
mixed at best. Selection of beneficiaries is primarily at the discretion of local Zakat committees,
and subject to some patronage at the local level. Also, the status of beneficiaries is not kept up-
to-date, resulting in beneficiaries continuing to receive support for years after their initial entry
into the program, regardless of their current status.58
Samurdhi Program in Sri Lankas9
Introduced in 1995, Samurdhi is the largest welfare program currently operating in the country.
The main component of the program (comprising about 80 percent of the total program budget) is
a consumption grant in the form of food stamps to means-tested eligible households. One of the
objectives of the program is to create employment for youth by hiring young men and women,
mostly local residents, as program administrators and development officers (niyamakas). Among
their duties are identifying and screening potential beneficiaries, using household questionnaires
about income sources and other welfare considerations -- the size of the grant varies from Rs. 100
to Rs. 1000 per month depending on these criteria.
Recent analysis finds the program to have considerable targeting problems - 44 percent of the
total budget benefits households in the top three quintiles, and 41 percent of households in the
lowest expenditure quintile are untouched by Samurdhi while a number of well-off households
receive transfers. 60 Samurdhi's targeting performance turns out to be inferior to that of the
median targeted program in a review of targeting outcomes of 47 government programs in Latin
America, and is in fact comparable with such untargeted programs as primary health care and
primary education. 61 Evidence suggests that targeting errors are most likely due to misallocation
of funds at the local level. The probability of being a beneficiary is found to differ significantly
by ethnic status, and qualitative findings suggest that party affiliation as well as voting patterns
influence allocation of Samurdhi grants. Thus targeting errors to a large extent seem to reflect
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flaws in the design of the program that allow for the deliberate omission of individuals belonging
to certain groups. Analysis also reveals that the transfers supply on average 13 percent of
household food expenditure by Samurdhi recipients, and that the impact on the welfare of
households belonging to the lower quintiles is larger than on the higher-income households.
Although the numbers suggest limited impact on consumption, such food stamps can be critical in
cushioning the effect of a shock experienced by the household. Only an explicit study of the
impact of food stamps on vulnerability, missing from the current evaluations, would be able to
identify and measure any such benefits from the program.
Improving Targeted Transfers
From the existing studies on impact and targeting some inferences can be made about the social
protection role of the Pakistani and Sri Lankan programs. For a means-tested transfer program to
perform the role of social protection, the program needs to have wide coverage, be able to
identify needy households and deliver benefits to them in a timely manner. Only then can it help
the poor cope with shocks and achieve the credibility critical for risk-mitigation. For Zakat,
limited scale and coverage of the programs, small size of the average transfer, and the evidence of
leakage to non-target households suggest that the program has a limited impact on vulnerability
of the target population. In order to make the program a better safety net, along with increasing
its scale, institutional arrangements must also be strengthened to better identify eligible persons
and make the application process transparent. In the case of Samurdhi, the role of food stamps as
an instrument for social protection seems to be undermined mainly by the presence of substantial
mis-targeting at the local level. Improvements in program design, especially in the mechanism to
identify beneficiaries, would help reduce these problems.
Beyond these inferences, very little can be said about the role of either of these programs as
instruments for social protection. This is because, as in the case with most transfer programs, no
explicit analysis has yet been conducted on the impact of the transfers in terms of reducing
vulnerability to shocks. In order to address this gap in knowledge, studies focused on the impact
of public transfers on risk and vulnerability, in the context of different countries in the region,
should be an important step toward evaluation, analysis and recommendation for improvement.
Providing insurance against various risks faced by the poor is a crucial element of social
protection. In South Asian countries, the opportunities for formal insurance are limited at
present, particularly because most of the poor are concentrated in the large informal sectors of
these countries, as well as in rural areas, where market failures caused by information problems
pose major obstacles to insurance by public or private providers. Moreover, such failures are
exacerbated by weak institutional capability in all South Asian countries for formal instruments
like unemployment insurance, pension or social security plans. While it will be imperative to
strengthen formal mechanisms, such changes will take time, and while moving in that direction,
informal mechanisms - properly supported - offer more realistic hope of providing effective
insurance in the short run.
Through innovations like using informal networks and group-lending, informal mechanisms like
microfinance and related institutions like broad community-based saving and insurance programs
provide ways to circumvent information problems that often lead to market failures.
Microfinance is thus an important example of interventions to address market failures (the
rationale for such intervention was discussed in some detail in Chapter I). While the governments
have had a limited role to play in the microfinance movement so far, the community-based
approach of microfinance can provide important lessons for the future, particularly in the context
of scaling up these programs towards wider geographical coverage and broader range of financial
services, where governments can play a crucial facilitating role.
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The Role of Microfinance in Social Protection
The microfinance movement has spread throughout South Asia to the point that 98 institutions
founded in or before 1992 currently provide financial services in each case to more than 1000
individuals and can be regarded as having achieved a certain degree of outreach and longevity.62
According to statistics based on a sample of 30 institutions, the total number of outstanding loans
for the region amounts to 20 percent of the worldwide figure, making up a loan portfolio equal to
13 percent of the global figure. A wide variety of institutions provide microfinance, among them
commercial banks, credit unions and cooperatives and NGOs, using different delivery
mechanisms. In comparison to microfinance institutions in other regions, South Asian
institutions seem to provide loans in smaller amounts to larger groups of people, with higher
repayment rates (average arrears rate of 4 percent compared to 15 percent worldwide), indicating
that smaller loan sizes have no adverse effects on repayment rates. The Grameen Bank and the
Sri Lanka National Savings Bank (SLNSB) account for approximately 89 percent of the value of
all micro-lending in the region. Although NGOs tend to operate on a much smaller scale than the
banks, with much lower average outstanding portfolios, loan size and clientele, they seem to be
responsible for offering financial services at the most micro levels. NGOs are also more likely
than other institutions, with the exception of Grameen Bank, to extend financial services to
women and rural clients and to focus more on providing social services than financially oriented
banks and credit unions. In general, South Asian institutions ". tend to invest heavily in social
services and are much more likely to use an integrated approach when providing microfinance
services than their global counterparts" (World Bank, 1997). The programs also have relatively
high incidence of female participants, 63 perhaps directly linked to the prevalence of mechanisms
like group-lending that often target women.
Many studies have documented the failures of rural finance programs intended for the poor at
subsidized interest rates, resulting from the fact that commercial banks often lack the information
to be effective lenders in rural settings. Thus even though such programs disburse large volumes,
they are not necessarily the most efficient means of channeling credit. Group-lending schemes,
used by 93 percent of microfinance institutions in South Asia (higher than in any other region
sampled), on the other hand are often able to circumvent the common sources of market failures,
namely adverse selection and moral hazard, associated with conventional lending. By relying on
peer pressure and the social information that the poor have about each other to monitor and
enforce contracts, group-based lending provides incentives for borrowers to repay and improves
selection of borrowers. Such lending also helps create social capital that enables loan repayment.
Group lending can also lead to better targeting because only the poor select themselves into
groups with other poor members. That said, evidence indicates that targeting has not been
universally successful.64 Studies have also documented barriers to participation in programs for
the very poor (see Hashemi 1997).
Impact of Microfinance
By improving access to credit, mnicrofinance is expected to ease constraints in production, raising
the long-term incomes and productivity of the poor. While recent evidence, mostly from
Bangladesh, does not tell a clear story about the impact of microfinance on poverty, there seems
to be more agreement on its role in reducing vulnerability of poor households. 65 Morduch
(1998a) finds consumption variability to be between 47 and 54 percent lower for eligible
Grameen, BRAC and BRDB households compared to a control group. Consumption smoothing
is driven by income smoothing as evident from the significantly lower labor supply variability
experienced by microcredit households as compared to those in the control group. There is also
evidence of widespread use of the loans themselves for consumption-smoothing - a case study of
credit transactions in a village in northern Bangladesh by Matin (1998) reveals that "more than 60
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percent of the total amount borrowed from microfinance institutions by the target group
households is diverted for consumption-smoothing (28 percent) and loan repayment purposes (35
percent)."(6 A World Bank study on Sri Lanka finds that extremely poor households allocate a
relatively large share of loans (around 40 percent) to consumption needs, in comparison to the
moderately poor and the vulnerable non-poor (27 and 23 percent respectively), who allocate
higher shares of loan amounts to supplementary income activity and housing improvements.
Reduction in vulnerability can also occur through the use of credit to build assets, via the increase
in productivity and incomes those assets provide, and the sale of the assets themselves during
periods of low income to smooth consumption. Available evidence suggests that the long-run
impact through investment in productive assets increases with the number of years of
participation in microcredit programs, and probably with loan sizes as well.67 Since the
moderately poor are more likely than the poorest to receive larger loans and participate for longer
times, this lends credence to the idea that moderately poor microcredit borrowers benefit more
than extremely poor borrowers over the long run. The reason for this would be that the poorest
have a number of constraints which prevent them from investing the loan in a high-return activity,
probably because of the high risk associated with a high-return activity or a long gestation period
for the returns to accrue. 68
In the absence of alternate forms of insurance, use of microcredit for consumption smoothing has
considerable stabilization benefits, especially important for the extreme poor, who otherwise
would often be excluded from all sources of credit. Sinha and Matin (1998) find that access to
microcredit for the poorest also improves their access to alternate informal sources of credit to
smooth consumption, often improving well-being in ways important for long-term development
of productivity. The insurance use of microcredit however has long-term costs. Credit used for
non-investment purpose does not generate income, meaning that repayment can only be achieved
at the cost of future consumption or through additional loans. Sinha and Matin's case study
reveals a worrying pattern -- the low marginal return on credit used for smoothing consumption
adversely affects the household's ability to maintain regular payments, necessitating further loans
to meet repayment obligations, creating conditions for a debt trap.
The tradeoff between the long-term poverty reducing objectives of microfinance and its short-
term use for insurance implies that providing alternative means of consumption-smoothing to the
poor, through programs that provide access to insurance and savings opportunities, will help
microfinance achieve its long-term objectives. Such programs can be based on principles similar
to those used for microcredit, namely the use of informal social networks and local knowledge to
circumvent information problems and mobilize support and awareness. While early microfinance
programs were not effective in mobilizing savings, recent experience has shown that even poor
households are eager to save if provided with safe, flexible accounts. Other than providing poor
households with the ability to smooth consumption, savings mobilization can also help the
sustainability of microfinance programs and create a client pool of borrowers.69 A broad
community-based approach to mobilize savings may be able to achieve results by generating
awareness of the value of saving and by innovative measures to induce participation, like
organizing the poor into small saving groups. A similar community-based strategy can also be
used to devise insurance schemes, as some microfinance institutions have already attempted, that
are accessible to and attractive for the poor.
Large Covariant Shocks and Microfinance
While microfinance has an important role to play in reducing vulnerability from idiosyncratic or
seasonal shocks, its effectiveness in mitigating large covariant shocks is questionable, with the
high vulnerability of the institutions themselves to such shocks being a serious concern. To
32
consider a recent example, the disastrous effects of the 1998 floods in Bangladesh on
microfinance clients, as well as the measures the microfinance institutions adopted to mitigate the
clients' suffering, caused these institutions to experience income losses, shortfalls in cash for new
loans due to delayed repayments and withdrawal of savings, client dropouts from groups, erosion
of capital base and difficulty in paying back institutional loans.70 The repayment rates for the
flood period were estimated at about 60 percent and the loss of interest income at 54 percent,
compared to 92 percent and 5 percent respectively for the period immediately preceding the
disaster. The situation was particularly difficult for small and medium-sized microfinance
institutions as they had less access to donor funds and fewer disaster funds to draw on.
Establishing a separate 'Disaster Fund' (of the type that large microfinance institutions in
Bangladesh already have), diversification of the risk portfolio by expanding geographical reach
and adopting some measures on the lines of those practiced by commercial lending institutions,
would be positive steps towards reducing the very high vulnerability of small and medium NGOs.
Finally the ability to tap into large amounts of funds from donors, both private and government,
in a crunch would be important. The government especially has a crucial role to play. Its
commitment to bolster the microfinance sector can mitigate the latter's vulnerability. From the
available evidence, it also appears that households are less able to insure themselves against
covariant shocks with microcredit -- therefore having to rely on borrowing from relatives and
moneylenders and reducing food consumption - than against idiosyncratic shocks or seasonal
falls in income. While withdrawal of savings can provide an important source of insurance for
the poor against covariant shocks, withdrawals may be constrained by institutional factors like
lack of accessibility of the institution's branches.
Thus while on the one hand, microfinance institutions need to be strengthened and modified to
make them less vulnerable to covariant shocks, on the other hand alternative mechanisms for
insurance need to be made available to the poor who are especially vulnerable to such shocks.
Providing instruments and facilities for safe and accessible savings that encourage the poor to
save will also provide a valuable source of insurance against covariant shocks.
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IV. Expanding Options for Risk Mitigation and Coping: Saving,
Insurance and Pension Reform
Mobilizing Savings of the Poor
Households that are able to save acquire the potential to provide self-insurance against a variety
of risks. Although each rural financial institution will want to tailor its approach to the specific
circumstances of its target clientele, some broad principles can be identified for effective
voluntary savings mobilization. Evidence has shown that even very poor households may be
eager to accumulate financial savings, and that liquidity, convenience and security appear to be
more important than interest rates on deposits in motivating their decisions to save.7 ' Since
liquidity is a critical consideration for the poor, saving schemes meant to attract them must allow
considerable flexibility in drawing on their savings. How and where deposits are invested
appears to be far less important than that deposits are mobilized from poor households. Where it
is costly to set up savings bank branches, simple mechanisms like post office savings plans,
which already exist in some countries in the region, may offer appealing options.
In recent years different kinds of rural financial institutions promoting informal savings schemes
have had much success with savings mobilization, examples of which are the Unit Desa program
of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI-UD) and the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives
(BAAC) in Thailand. While microfinance institutions like the Grameen Bank and BRAC have
encouraged savings by requiring mandatory savings by client-members who want to gain access
to loans, the approach of BRI-UD and BAAC has been to mobilize voluntary deposits separate
from credit transactions. Their success can be partly attributed to the variety of savings
instruments they offer.72 Safe Save in Bangladesh (Box 4.1) and the Cooperative Development
Foundation in India are relatively recent programs that have succeeded so well in mobilizing
savings that they serve as their major source of funds. Behind such successes has been the ability
to organize communities at the grassroots level as well as to decentralize key elements of
decision-making to groups within communities - important for ownership and commitment.
Box 4.1: Safe Save in Bangladesh: Mobilizing Savings to Attain Financial Sustainability
Safe Save is a financial services provider, which works in the poorer slums of Dhaka, the capital of
Bangladesh. Starting in late 1996, by early 1999 it had a little less than 3,000 clients, with about around
50,000 US dollars of clients' savings and about 75,000 US dollars of loans outstanding. Despite its small
size, it attracts attention because of its unique products. Its products are designed to enable very poor slum
dwellers turn their capacity to save into usefully large lump sums conveniently and quickly, by offering its
clients, in essence, a full individual banking service on their doorstep. There is no group formation. Bank
workers, called Collectors, visit each client every day six days a week. On each visit clients may save,
withdraw, or repay loans in any amount they choose, or take loans on their doorstep in amounts based on
their proven capacity to save and repay. Given this flexibility, many clients transact very regularly, in
volumes that exceed those of more conventional schemes for the poor. Using cost cutting devices - like
recruiting Collectors from among the slum dwellers themselves, and full computerization - Safe Save
already covers its operational costs from its loan interest income, and with growth, promises to become
fully economically sustainable.
Source: Matin, Hulme and Rutherford, 1999
Public policy can help in integrating the wide variety of savings programs that exist in these
countries, which can in turn lead to widening of the risk pool, allowing the financial system to
easily handle localized shocks. The keys to a successful savings program are providing long-term
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security and convenience, finding a way to hedge against inflation, minimizing costs, and
exploiting opportunities to re-lend deposits safely and profitably. 73 While existing banks and
community-based efforts may not be up to all these tasks at present, public policy can be critical
for attaining these objectives. Liberalizing financial markets so that saving and lending
institutions can exploit market opportunities, complemented by designing effective, but not
overly intrusive, prudential regulations can promote effective savings mobilization.74
Insuring the Poor against Risk
Experience with Public Crop Insurance7 5
Vulnerability could also be addressed directly by providing access to insurance against such
contingencies as crop failure, loss of income, illness and natural disasters, to poor households.
Insurance schemes for livelihood in rural areas in most developing regions, including South Asia,
have focused almost entirely on agriculture and within agriculture on crops much more than on
livestock. Rural insurance providers have to diversify across different types of crops, farms,
regions and sectors of the economy in order to reduce their risks, but such diversification usually
raises administrative costs. Accordingly, most conmmercial banks focus on large commercial
farms rather than on smaller holdings or riskier clients. The rationale for public agricultural
insurance schemes is that they are able to diversify better by pooling risks at a national or
regional level. However, experiences with public crop insurance have mostly been disappointing.
To be financially sustainable in the long run, the insurer must satisfy the condition Z < 1, where
Z = (A+ I)/P, implying that the insurer's average income from premiums (P) must cover
average indemnities paid (I) plus average administrative costs (A).76 For public crop insurers in
developing countries, Z ratios are usually well above 1, and A is often as high as 30 percent of P.
In fact, loss ratios alone (I/P) were as high as 5.19 in Bangladesh and 6.87 in India on a
cumulative basis during the late 1980s (FAO 1992).7 In spite of the high costs, there is little
evidence to show that crop insurance has had any positive impacts. Farmers do not always
demand such insurance, probably due to the adverse selection that often groups them into risk
categories when premiums are calculated, but distributes benefits tailored to individual losses.
Heavily subsidized insurance can also have the negative effects of encouraging excessive risk-
taking by farmers, and creating dependence on government assistance during droughts. Further,
the impact of crop insurance, if any, is limited to farmers who grow insured crops, and is of no
consequence to vulnerable groups like landless laborers, whose livelihood is also affected by
agricultural disasters.
While public support for insurance is necessary, public insurance schemes can be successful only
if some basic principles are adhered to. These include making the insurer responsible for its own
financial affairs, and denying automatic access to government funds to cover losses. Coverage
should also be written mainly on insurable risks - named perils over which clients have little
control. Where moral hazard cannot be avoided, deductible and other co-insurance arrangements
should be used. Available weather records and information about clients should be used to
calculate actuarially based premiums, adjusted over time to reflect actual loss payments.
Incentive problems among clients can be addressed by tailoring premiums, indemnities and
deductibles to the risk level of individual clients or to fairly narrowly defined client groups. The
insurer should also develop a rational insurance portfolio for managing risk, which should be
diversified as much as possible across regions and activities.
While commercial insurers in many developing countries do adhere to these principles and are
thus able to operate, they usually insure only large-scale, commercial farmers growing high-value
crops. The experience with insurance is somewhat similar to that with commercial credit that
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does not reach the poorest. As with credit, innovation is needed to provide insurance for small
farmers and other groups of rural poor. Such innovations are also needed to insure the poor
against health and other forms of idiosyncratic risk that are not easily verifiable and thus may not
be covered by commercial or public insurance schemes that follow sustainable practices.
Alternative Approaches to Insurance
One example of innovations in insurance involves adopting community-based mechanisms to
circumvent information failures, for example by relying on existing relationships, peer pressure
and group interaction to induce correct behavior and reduce moral hazard. For covariant risks, a
potential strategy involves the use of index and area-based contracts, where insurers write
contracts against specific perils or events defined and recorded at regional level.
Community-Based Efforts:
A number of grassroot organizations have recently undertaken a variety of approaches to
delivering insurance services at the community level, using local knowledge and facilitated by the
existing trust between the institutions and their clients. In the case of the Self-Employed
Women's Association (SEWA) in India, for example, delivery of health, asset and life insurance
is dependent on the organizing strength of cooperatives and long-term grassroot level
involvement. Grameen Kalyan, an offshoot of the Grameen Bank, draws on a long history of
peer-group strategies and self-help groups to provide health insurance through its Rural Health
program (RHP), in addition to life and disability insurance (Box 4.2). A crucial element in the
success till date of these organizations has been their ability to forge partnerships between
cooperative social protection and publicly provided services. SEWA links cooperative social
protection with national insurance companies and government subsidies channeled through the
SEWA Bank, while Grameen Kalyan links cooperative mechanisms to the public health-care
system. While the insurance programs are still at a nascent stage and need further development
as well as analysis, they suggest potentially successful approaches that can possibly be replicated
on a larger scale for maximum impact.
Although the government should not participate directly in the design and delivery of such
programs, in order for them to retain their community-driven qualities, it can play the crucial role
of promoting such efforts, through support of the kind that is provided to SEWA and Grameen
Kalyan. A critical role of the govemnment - especially in the context of efforts to scale up
existing programs -- would also be to undertake reforms in the financial sector which would open
up market opportunities to such organizations, and to create the right regulatory environment for
these opportunities to be realized. Creating the right regulatory environment would involve
setting regulations and standards that increase transparency, along with legal and institutional
systems that are able to enforce the regulations.
While liberalization of financial sector has the potential of creating great opportunities, it will
also pose fresh challenges. For example, the ongoing process of opening up the insurance market
in India to private providers offers an organization like SEWA the opportunity to design and
administer its own insurance scheme. At the same time, the likely shift from public to private
funding of insurance also raises questions about the existing arrangements between the public
schemes and the organization. The ability to work in partnership with private and public sources,
as well as to link existing programs to the formal financial market will thus be crucial to the
future success of insurance programs run by organizations like SEWA and Grameen Kalyan.
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Box 4.2: Insuring the Poor - the Programs of Grameen Kalyan and SEWA
Grameen Kalyan is a not-for profit company founded in 1997, when it took over the Rural Health
Program (RHP) initiated by the Grameen Bank in 1993. The RHP acts both as an insurer and health-
care provider through health centers attached to branches of the Grameen Bank. Each health-care unit
uses local expertise at the Grameen Bank branch to spread awareness on the benefits of insurance,
preventive care and services available at the center. Referrals are used to utilize the existing public
health infrastructure and minimize overlap of services. The RHP corresponding to each Grameen Bank
branch is created only after a consensus is reached in discussion with members, who decide whether to
subscribe to the annual plan for the RHP. Annual premiums are collected from member-households
associated with a Health Center. Different types of pricing schemes for various service packages, and
supplementary services for additional premium are available. Subsidies to the scheme are targeted to
poor households - identified by Grameen Bank branch staff in the area - within the Health Center zones.
The services package presently includes a combination of annual check-ups, subsidized laboratory tests,
quality medicines for below market price, maternal and child health care, preventive care, and partial
expenses of hospitalization, specialist consultation and tests in case of referrals. Presently receiving
premiums from about 66 percent of Grameen members, Health Centers on average have recovered
approximately 65 percent of total operational costs; it is estimated that cost recovery will increase
significantly as more members get insured.
SEWA is a registered trade union working mainly with women in informal sector, with a membership of
almost a quarter of a million. In addition to performing conventional labor-union functions, SEWA
provides legal aid, operates a bank and an Integrated Social Security Program - the largest
comprehensive contributory social security scheme in India today for informal workers, with health, life
and disability and asset insurance for over 32,000 workers. Membership and claims processing is done
through SEWA Bank, helped by considerable field presence and grassroots organizing by the bank and
union staff. Premiums are also collected through mobile services similar to collection methods normally
associated with microfinance programs. Flexible premium structures have been designed to suit
different income groups among the poor. About a third of the costs are covered by premiums; the rest is
financed by external grants and subsidies from the government in collaboration with two public/private
insurance companies. SEWA views contributions by members as a step toward their increased
participation in the design and administration of the scheme. The combination of microfinance, insurance
and union services has increased SEWA's membership and helped raise the incomes of its members.
The experience of these voluntary and demand-driven programs shows that not only can social security
provision be sustainable for the poor (or informal sector workers), but also that the poor are willing to
pay increasing amounts as long as the service is appropriately designed and sensitive to their needs.
Source: Lund and Srinivas, 1999
Index and Area-Based Insurance Contracts7 8 :
Area-based index insurance involves writing contracts against specific perils or events, like loss
in average yield in the area, drought or flood, which are defined and recorded at a regional level.
Insurance is sold in standard units with a contract for each unit purchased called a Standard Unit
Contract (SUC), with fixed premium rates and indemnity per SUC for all buyers in a given
region. An example of such a scheme is area-based crop-yield insurance written against the
average yield for a region with payment made whenever the measured yield for the region falls
below some pre-defined limit.79 Since such coverage requires long and reliable series of area-
yield data, not always available in South Asia, contracts contingent on rainfall or soil moisture
can effectively protect against losses due to drought or excess rainfall.
Such insurance has a number of attractive features - administrative costs can be held low since
there are no individual contracts to write and no individual loss assessments, and marketing can
be easy since SUCs could be sold like coupons or lottery tickets. Moral hazard is reduced
because the insured individual has no control over the probability of the insured event and
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therefore has the same incentive as an uninsured person. Insurance of this kind would be
attractive to anyone (not necessarily farmers) whose livelihood is correlated with the insured
event, and should also be relatively easy for the private sector to run, in fact providing a possible
entry point for them to develop other kinds of insurance for rural areas. A secondary market in
the SUCs might also emerge, making SUCs a more liquid asset, attractive especially to the poor
who highly value such liquidity. Most importantly, a well-designed index insurance can be a part
of a sustainable strategy for insuring the poor against covariant risks, to complement other
instruments like conventional insurance, credit, or community-based mechanisms that insure
against idiosyncratic risks.
The high levels of covariant risks for which such contracts are designed can be potentially
troubling for insurers who face the possibility of having to pay out huge indemnities. To hedge
against this risk, the insurer can either diversify regionally, or sell part of the risk to the
international markets through reinsurance or in the emerging markets for sharing catastrophic
risk. In case of catastrophe, reinsurance will usually be possible only through large international
reinsurers with the ability to spread their own risks among different parts of the world with risks
of catastrophic events that are not positively correlated. Despite significant growth in recent
years, international reinsurance markets still have limited capacity.'o Given these limitations,
there may be a role for new, global financial instruments like "catastrophe" bonds issued against
rainfall events in specific countries or regions where risks would be uncorrelated with those of
other financial investments. Governments may also facilitate reinsurance by selling options on the
index in the international market, reducing the risk to the reinsurer and lowering the price of
reinsurance.
Although the ultimate goal of policy should be private provision of insurance, public intervention
may be needed in South Asian countries to provide the initial impetus for such activity. Such
start-up measures would include promoting the necessary research, educating rural people about
the value of the insurance, and most importantly, ensuring that the measurement and monitoring
of natural events, like rainfall, are accurate, timely and credible. To attract private insurers, the
government may also have an initial financial role to play in underwriting insurance. In order to
facilitate private-sector insurance as well as to protect the interests of clients, the government will
also need to establish an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for such institutions.
Reforming Pension Systems in South Asia
The economic and social risks associated with old age contribute in a major way to vulnerability
of the poor in South Asia. Old age is usually associated with the risk of loss of livelihood on the
economic front, and isolation on the social front. In most South Asian countries, evidence
suggests that informal family-support systems are major sources of old age security. Little is
known, however, about the extent and adequacy of family support of the aged or about intra-
household resource-allocation that may not always favor the old. Studies that have attempted to
overcome these methodological problems have found evidence that informal safety nets are not
always adequate.8 ' Evidence from developed countries also indicate that as income and life
expectancy rise, family support systems tend to come under increasing strain, particularly in
urban areas, due to the increased mobility of household members, increase in the aged population
and changes in attitudes. Formal schemes, in principle, can compensate for many of the
inadequacies of informal systems. Public policy can facilitate formal savings and insurance
schemes that provide old-age security to those who have the ability to make provisions for old
age. Pension schemes and provident funds also have the advantage of greater scale economies
and broader risk pools compared to family support systems, leading to lower transactions cost and
better risk mitigation. Formal pension systems are however limited in their scope and coverage in
most South Asian countries,8 and institutional deficiencies limit the potential for reform of
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pension systems without complementary broad-based reform of financial markets. Even if such
reforms became successful over the long run, coverage among vulnerable groups, like the poor in
the informal sector, is likely to remain low.
A quick look at the pension system in India will illustrate some of facts, keeping in mind that the
general picture is fairly typical for most South Asian countries. Public instruments for old-age
support in India take the forms of compulsory savings or insurance programs, voluntary savings
with favorable tax treatment and social assistance to the elderly. Heavy concentration of labor in
the informal sector automatically excludes a large proportion of the workforce from compulsory
schemes limited to the organized sector, resulting in a combined coverage rate (for the main old-
age schemes) of below 10 percent of the labor force. For poor informal-sector workers,
participation in voluntary schemes like the PPF (the primary available instrument) is limited by
the fact that the returns from available schemes are usually not enough to induce long-term
savings from the poor who value liquidity very highly. In addition, the main incentive for
participation in voluntary schemes, namely a reduction in tax rates, is relevant to only about 2-3
percent of the workforce who pay taxes, a group that almost certainly excludes the poor in the
informal sector. As a result, the voluntary schemes have extremely low participation rates of
between 0.2 and 0.8 percent of the labor force. The social assistance scheme for the elderly
involves every state providing some kind of means-tested pension to older citizens, supplemented
by a pension scheme of the national government. In most states coverage is less than 10 percent
of persons above age 60, suggesting that most of the poor elderly are excluded from these
programs. The two pensions together also have a very low benefit level equivalent to around 5
percent of the average wage.83
Broad Recommendations for Pension Reform
A detailed study of the pension system in India lays the foundation for future pension reform." A
similar exercise for all countries in the region is imperative as background to making specific and
detailed reform recommendations geared to conditions in each country. In the absence of such
studies, a few general guidelines, mostly derived from the India study, should be relevant to the
entire region. The general recommendations for pension reform, as briefly articulated by WDR
(2000), propose establishing a multi-pillar system that combines a publicly managed defined-
benefit or social-assistance plan with a privately managed defined-contribution plan,
supplemented by voluntary retirement savings. While the publicly managed component should
be funded by tax revenues and can address poverty and equity concerns, the privately managed
plan would be fully funded by participant contributions and provide pensions on retirement.85
Several countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe have established such systems.
As a first step, it will be necessary to formulate a clear set of policy objectives for key targets like
the level of protection for all covered workers. The strategy must also address the incentive
problems that restrict program participation by adopting investing strategies conducive to higher
rates of return for long-term savings and by liberalizing investment rules in line with international
practice, in order for which to succeed, the right institutions and regulatory framework in the
financial market have to be created. A well regulated, decentralized and competitive pension
sector would help achieve higher rates of return along with better quality of services to members.
Once target levels and the required institutional frameworks are determined, the transition to the
'new' system has to be carefully mapped out, where the pace of transition must take into account
the need for parallel financial sector reforms and the need to set up the regulatory apparatus.
A pension reform initiative must also incorporate measures to harness informal institutions in the
provision of social security, especially in the light of the short-term limitations of formal systems.
Expanding existing public social-assistance schemes would help address the old-age risk of those
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beyond the reach of the formal system; fostering partnerships between government social
assistance programs and community-based institutions, especially with regard to identifying
beneficiaries and delivery of benefits, would improve targeting by such programs. Organizations
like SEWA or the Society for Promotion of Area Resource Centers (SPARC) in India, or the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh may also be in a position to utilize their large client bases and
relationships with clients to offer long-term saving services and insurance directly to the poor.
The main obstacle faced by such community-driven efforts is creating interest among members
for long-term contractual savings instruments, given the members' need for liquidity and
flexibility.86 The direct provision of long-term services also can prove costly, especially for
smaller organizations. Financial sector reforms could help address such issues, for example by
enabling investments (of long-term savings) to earn higher returns, and by initiating privately
managed open pension funds, where community-based institutions can arrange for group
contracts that would reduce asset management charges. Creating the right regulatory framework
and support institutions, and instituting financial-sector reforms would be important means for the
government to promote provision of social security by community-based institutions; direct
assistance in the form of grants for specific programs may also be necessary in the early stages.
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V. Guidelines For A Social Protection Strategy
Improving the growth performance of an economy is imperative for achieving reduction in
poverty, risk and vulnerability in the long run. Improvements in investment climate,
liberalization of various sectors to create opportunities for private enterprise, creating the right
regulatory mechanism to induce competitive behavior, promoting export performance, and fiscal
reforms that make for a stable macroeconomic environment that promotes growth, will all
contribute in the long run towards reducing vulnerability. Liberalization and strengthening of
markets to promote private enterprise will expand risk-mitigating options by creating access to
financial instruments to larger sections of the population, and by allowing for better risk sharing
across individuals and regions.
While such policy measures are necessary, the fact remains that in countries in South Asia, most
of these changes will involve institutional and structural reforms that require a long time horizon.
Many countries in the region have already embarked on such a reform process. But while such
reforms are undertaken and their impacts realized over the long run, it will be important to
incorporate explicit short-term measures that address the vulnerability of the poor and assist them
to improve their risk-management options. This is all the more important because risk and
vulnerability by themselves have considerable negative implications for economic growth of a
country. As the discussion in previous chapters have shown, exposure to risk and lack of
opportunities to manage risk can prevent adoption of highly productive technologies, and lead to
other adjustments in behavior that stifle productivity and innovation, at the cost of growth in the
long run.
Given the mutual reinforcing relationship between vulnerability and growth, promoting risk
management in the short run will thus create better conditions for poverty-reducing growth in the
long run. The lack of formal institutions in the South Asian countries, coupled with the fact that
the poor are concentrated in rural areas and in the informal sector, where information problems
often lead to market failures, would mean that formal or market-based options are limited for risk
management in the immediate future. The major immediate challenge for a social protection
strategy thus lies in designing instruments that can effectively reach the poor, given their virtual
exclusion from formal institutions of credit and insurance, in countries where such institutions are
highly inadequate in the first place.
Principles for Designing Comprehensive Strategies for Countries in the Region
Designing a comprehensive social protection strategy should involve assessment of risk and
evaluation of the current social protection landscape, including the specific kinds of risks and
institutional arrangements relevant to each country, before an optimal mix of policies can be
decided on. Such a strategy, in order to be comprehensive and operational, would have to be
country-specific, and must be informed by analytical work at the country level. The broad
principles for designing such a comprehensive strategy are outlined below.
* Typology of Risk: Arrive at a typology of the types of different types of risks prevalent in the
region, classifying them as idiosyncratic or covariant so as to identify important sources of
risk and inform policy responses; also identify the vulnerable groups and the factors that
make them vulnerable.
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- In-depth analysis is necessary for each individual country, especially since it is obvious
that conditions differ even among countries in the region and can only be addressed by
country-specific policy design.
- Very seldom is information on the different types of risk, whether they are idiosyncratic or
covariant, available from traditional household surveys. Special efforts are necessary to
develop an information base for identifying the critical sources of idiosyncratic and
covariant shocks in the context of specific countries and regions within countries. In many
cases, surveys that incorporate qualitative information can help identify the sources and
types of shocks for specific countries and regions.
* Measurement of Vulnerability: Assess the extent, trends and determinants of income and
expenditure volatility, analyze the role and limitations of informal self-protection and group-
based mechanisms in managing the risk of poor households, and measure the impact of
vulnerability on households. This can be done through a combination of country-level
analytical work at the Bank, including poverty assessments/updates and sectoral work in
areas like education, health and rural development.
- The understanding of poverty should go beyond the "traditional" static measurement of
poverty status to capture its dynamics, namely the movement of households into and out of
poverty and the likelihood that those who are already poor could fall into deeper poverty.
Such an exercise ideally would need panel data on household expenditure, income and
other measures of well-being seldom available for the countries in the region. Identifying
indicators of vulnerability would be also greatly facilitated by suitably incorporating
qualitative information to capture the sources of non-income dimensions of risk.
- Such information can have enormous policy implications in choosing the appropriate
policy as well as in ensuring the appropriate targeting tools. If, for example, transitory
poverty is as high as some studies suggest, then targeting anti-poverty programs using
characteristics of the currently poor will not be enough, and must be complemented by
strategies geared toward increasing exits from and reducing entry into poverty. Identifying
the determinants of poverty transitions would then become critical. A related question
would be whether a temporary "shock" could cause a previously non-poor household to
sink into chronic poverty. If the answer were yes, then long-term benefits would flow from
safety-net policies that effectively protect people from transient shocks.
- Vulnerability in the context of South Asia has implications beyond those measurable from
household-level data. Specific members within poor households, children and women,
especially widows, are often particularly vulnerable. For more detailed measurement and
analysis of intra-household dimensions of vulnerability, future surveys need to go beyond
information gathering at the household level, by collecting information pertaining to
individual household members, as well as intra-household allocations and decision-
making. Again, qualitative surveys can play a crucial role here, by helping understand
those aspects of vulnerability that are not apparent in quantitative responses.
* Evaluating Existing Options: Evaluate the existing forms of public and private (informal and
formal) mechanisms in each country, which help the poor mitigate and cope with risk so that,
wherever possible, evaluations can generate suggestions for strengthening existing programs
and expanding promising initiatives. The existing knowledge base in these spheres is weak.
-The knowledge base in the domain of informal mechanisms needs to be strengthened for
many reasons. First, greater understanding would enable a more systematic assessment of
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the adequacy (or lack of) of such mechanisms. Second, the identification of effective
delivery modes would inform proposals to harness such mechanisms in the design of
interventions. Third, knowledge can ensure that as formal institutions are put into place,
they do not supplant or destroy valid existing options for the poor.
-Evaluations should focus on the broad issues of coverage, effectiveness, and incentives
created by formal and informal mechanisms. One vital element of the evaluation exercise
will be to conduct analysis of safety nets spending at the national and local levels, which
will help identify the scale, incidence and inefficiencies of existing expenditures. Public
expenditure reviews (PERs) at the country and provincial levels conducted by the Bank
could be a vehicle for such analysis.
* Deriving the Optimal Mix: Assess the optimal mix and methods of delivery of various
interventions necessary to address multidimensional risk. The strategy must have a poverty
focus, given the close and mutually reinforcing relationship between poverty and
vulnerability in the region. The answer to how the mix of interventions will be provided will
depend largely on the type of risk and the institutional capability of the country in question.
The design of an optimal strategy should involve (a) identifying the priorities in terms of
vulnerable groups and specific risks, (b) deciding on the combination of instruments to be
used, (c) setting goals for the programs, and (d) developing an implementation structure,
identifying strategic partners on the ground.
Elements of a Social Protection Strategy in South Asia
While the principles outlined above can guide country-specific social protection strategies for the
region, the review conducted in this paper suggests some essential elements that are broadly
applicable to the region as a whole. These elements should be looked upon as the set of issues
that can guide a regional strategy; the general guidelines that emerge must then be modified and
adapted for specific country situations, as well as the capability of individual countries.
Strengthening Risk-Mitigating Options
The review of existing government, private or community-based options suggests some broad
principles to improve and expand their role in mitigating risk. As mentioned before, institutional
reforms that promote and expand market opportunities, backed by a regulatory environment that
induce competitive behavior, are intrinsic elements of a long-term social protection strategy for
all countries in the region. However, such institutional changes that create formal mechanisms
for social protection will take time to have their desired effect. Meanwhile, given the prevalence
of risk and vulnerability in the region, it will be imperative to governments to incorporate
measures that provide risk management options in the immediate future. This can be done, as the
paper has argued, through a combination of expanding and strengthening existing options in
public safety net programs, and building on existing community-based instruments that have met
with some success in the recent past. Some of these important short-run options for social
protection are listed below:
1) Targeted Public Safety Net Programs: Given the lack of formal financial instruments to
manage risk, targeted public safety net programs like workfare and means-tested assistance in
cash or kind, can be important immediate options for governments to provide risk benefits to
the poor. A number of such programs are already in place in South Asian countries, lessons
from which can be drawn upon to design new programs and improve existing ones. While
these programs are often looked upon as poverty reducing or redistributive, by their very
nature they also have the potential of providing considerable risk benefits. Therefore, as
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Chapter IH of this paper has argued, the design these programs should be adapted to address
vulnerability arising out of short-term exposure to shocks, and a review of some existing
programs (in Chapters II and EI) offers some guidelines to realize their safety net potential.
Some broad issues important for the design of such programs are listed below.
* For the most part, the design of safety net should be such that some reciprocal action is
necessary from beneficiaries, to ensure that only those who need assistance self-select
into programs, and to reduce dependency. Public works programs, which help the poor
to cope with community-wide shocks and seasonal in return for physical labor, satisfy
this principle. Direct transfers which do not have such reciprocity should be instruments
for targeting especially vulnerable groups like the elderly, the disabled and widows
among the poor, who have recourse to no assets, including their own labor. The main
areas to focus on for public programs are improving the programs' targeting and aligning
them to better concentrate on vulnerable groups. It is also important to establish
credibility among the potential beneficiaries of such programs in order to ensure the
objective of risk-mitigation, which has been true for successful workfare programs like
the EGS in India.
* Public safety nets, especially in the form of targeted transfers to highly vulnerable
groups, such as needy widows and elderly people, may also crowd out informal risk
mitigation mechanisms including private transfers and reciprocity-based arrangements.
The design of the program should take this issue into account to minimize such
displacement. However in some cases, some amount of crowding-out can be tolerated as
the necessary cost of expanding coverage to include a large previously unprotected
population. This would be true if private transfers had hitherto covered only a part of the
target population, or if the coverage was inadequate.
* Targeted social safety net programs can also be designed to protect the human capital of
the poor. To cope with a shock, the poorest households are often likely to withdraw from
basic health and education services, for instance by withdrawing children from schools,
with long-term repercussions. Safety net programs can provide additional incentives to
such households to avoid costly adjustments to human development, examples of which
are programs in Pakistan and Bangladesh that provide food for girls attending school.
2) Informal Instruments for Social Protection: Innovations based on informal instruments seem
to offer some of the most immediate options for effectively mitigating the risks of the poor.
The success of microfinance, especially in the area of credit (see Chapter III), offers some
valuable lessons in harnessing informal institutions and local knowledge to overcome
information problems in providing financial services. Some of these options, which seem to
hold considerable promise in South Asia, have been reviewed in Chapter IV, and are
summarized below.
* Since most South Asian countries are characterized by limited market coverage of the
banking sector, encouraging savings programs through community-based efforts could be
an important way to help the poor insure against risk, as exemplified by the success of
recent community-driven programs in Bangladesh and India in encouraging the poor to
save. Public policy can play an important role here by helping integrate small individual
programs that exist currently, so that the risk pool is wide enough for the system to easily
handle localized shocks. Public funds can also be used to support expansion, monitoring,
and evaluation of pilot savings schemes to draw lessons for broader application. For
long-term sustainability and expansion of such programs, it will be necessary to
undertake institutional reforms - liberalizing financial markets so that saving and lending
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institutions can exploit market opportunities, complemented by suitable prudential
regulations can promote effective savings mobilization.
* Community-based approaches that share risks fairly broadly can also be an important
innovation for designing effective insurance for the poor. Successful examples of such
efforts can be found in the programs of SEWA and Grameen Bank in India and
Bangladesh respectively. Such efforts have relied on community participation and group-
based mechanisms to stimulate participation in insurance programs. The government can
support such efforts by providing technical and financial support in the start-up phase
(which can be crucial for scaling up existing programs), and by creating an enabling legal
and regulatory framework for such institutions. Achieving long-term sustainability and
expanding the outreach of these programs will also require reforms in the financial sector
that would open up market opportunities to them.
Over a longer time horizon, a social protection strategy must incorporate institutional reforms that
create market opportunities that promote growth and enable increased access to formal
mechanisms for risk management. Some important medium and long term priorities in social
protection for countries in the region are discussed briefly below:
1) Strengthening Formal Institutions for Social Protection: All the countries in the region are
characterized by weak institutional capability for formal social protection, like unemployment
insurance, pension or social security plans as well as mobilization of savings. Broad-based
financial and regulatory reforms, along with market liberalization to promote private
enterprise, are essential for reducing poverty and vulnerability in the long run. Moreover, as
the discussion on informal instruments above mentioned, such reforms will also allow
informal instruments to make use of market opportunities, which would be crucial for their
continued success.
* Institutional reforms, including liberalization of the financial sector along with the
creation of regulatory mechanisms that promote transparency, will be crucial for the
expansion of market-based insurance opportunities. Important elements in creating the
right regulatory environment would be establishing rigorous accounting standards and
disclosure requirements, backed by legal and institutional systems to supervise and
enforce the regulations. These measures would help reduce information problems and
mitigate perverse incentives, factors that limit participation and often lead to market
failures in formal credit and insurance markets.
* Critical issues in the design of formal instruments of risk management, such as
unemployment insurance, pensions and social security will be the ability of these
schemes to attract participants, and to operate in a sustainable manner. To meet those
objectives in the context of mitigating the risks of old age, a broad-based pension reform
is needed in countries. This should be in the form of a multi-pillar system - combining a
privately managed defined-contribution plan with a public social-assistance plan for the
needy among the elderly, supplemented by voluntary retirement savings - supported by
financial liberalization and creation of the necessary institutions and regulatory
framework. It will be critical to harness informal community-based institutions to target
social assistance to those unable to participate in contributory schemes, and also to
provide social security in the informal sector where most of these schemes will not be
able to operate. Financial liberalization supported by the right regulatory environment
would help formal safety net mechanisms by opening up these programs to market
opportunities and private participation, while institutional improvements (that lead to
better information base for instance) can improve their functioning and expand coverage.
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* Reform programs underway in most South Asian countries - opening up the insurance
market to the private sector in India being a recent example - are steps in the right
direction. In order for market opportunities to be realized, such reforms must be
complemented by suitable regulations and institutions of governance that promote
transparency and induce market discipline.
* Creating the right regulatory environment, for example through strictly enforced
disclosure requirements, would also help reduce the information problems that constrain
savings mobilization by formal institutions. Moreover, government supported deposit
insurance, by mitigating the consequences of bank failure, can circumvent some of the
information problems limiting savings; its advantages must however be balanced against
associated moral hazard problems which may lead to imprudent practices by banks and
clients alike. In order to promote savings, it will also be important to reduce
macroeconomic risks, particularly with respect to price and exchange rate volatility,
which will assure the poor that the value of savings will be protected.
2) Poverty Reduction Programs and Risk Reduction: Although poverty-reducing interventions
in the areas of health and education do not provide direct insurance or risk-mitigation
benefits, they are important long-term measures for reducing risk. Improving income
diversification opportunities especially for rural areas, through improved extension services
and access to credit are elements of a poverty reduction strategy that will contribute towards
reducing risk. Although microfinance is an important lever for creating such opportunities,
there is evidence that microfinance loans are often used to smooth consumption rather than to
generate income and diversify its sources. This practice undermines the objectives of
microcredit and points to the need for community-based insurance programs (as discussed
above) that would complement lending and directly address the consumption-smoothing
needs of the poor people, so that microcredit loans are used productively.
3) Insuring Against Covariant Shocks: Covariant shocks such as natural disasters, crop disease
or pestilence, affect entire communities or regions. As a result, informal and group-based
mechanisms, as well as traditional formal mechanisms that are able to assist in the case of
idiosyncratic shocks, may become unsustainable due to lack of diversification in the risk
pool. Designing insurance to address such risks is an enormous challenge, given the lack of
opportunities for diversification and hedging. Public as well as private supported crop
insurance schemes in the past have met with failure in insuring against agricultural shocks
due to various reasons (see Chapter IV).
* An innovative instrument, namely index-based insurance, which by design reduces
transactions cost and moral hazard problems, is one measure that can help address the
risk of crop failure and natural calamities (detailed discussion in Chapter IV). This
option is relatively unexplored, but an experiment along these lines is underway in
Bangladesh. Although the ultimate goal of policy should be private provision of
insurance, the government will need to establish an appropriate legal and regulatory
framework for such institutions. Public intervention may also be needed to provide the
initial impetus, by ensuring accurate, timely and credible measurement and monitoring of
natural events, and by performing other roles including that of financial underwriting.
An important challenge with regard to index-based insurance is also to be able to
diversify the risk pool. Potential solutions to this problem lie in the insurer being able to
diversify across large regions or countries, or being able to sell part of the risk to the
international market. A well-designed index insurance can be a part of a sustainable
strategy for insuring the poor against covariant risks, to complement other instruments
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like conventional insurance, credit, or community-based mechanisms that insure against
idiosyncratic risks.
Strengthening Risk-Coping Options
A crucial element of a social protection strategy will also be to provide risk-coping options, since
a large number of risks cannot be eliminated. This is especially true in the case of such covariant
shocks as natural disasters (flooding, droughts, hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.), where most
insurance mechanisms, formal and informal, tend to fail. Community-based instruments like
microfinance and small saving groups turn out to be inadequate, and often vulnerable themselves,
to such shocks.87 A proper disaster-management strategy, planned by the government and its
partners in advance, and implemented promptly, would help in coping with such shocks. A few
important components of such a strategy are listed below.
1) A comprehensive disaster management strategy must develop mechanisms for inunediate and
widespread relief efforts in the event of the disaster. Wherever possible, the help of local
community-based and non-governmental institutions, should be elicited for creating an
efficient distribution network and identifying the affected people. The strategy should also
incorporate public health measures to guard against diseases and epidemics that often occur
in the aftermath of natural disasters, focusing especially on highly vulnerable groups like
children and the elderly.
2) The strategy should also incorporate explicit measures to address the more long-term needs of
the affected people, namely providing them assistance to rebuild their lives, including homes
and livelihood. Such assistance can take various forms, including direct grants, subsidized
loans, technical help, and skills training, to name a few. Public works programs can provide
an important coping mechanism for people who have lost their livelihood, while helping in
the process of rebuilding communities and infrastructure. The recent devastating earthquake
in India is an example of a very serious covariant shock, which demands a comprehensive
strategy for coping and reconstruction. The World Bank's role in such a strategy, involving
financial and technical assistance, are based on some core principles that stress a
decentralized approach with the direct involvement of the government, communities and the
private sector (Box 5.1). The strategy also incorporates assistance to develop disaster
management capacity of the state, which will help in coping with future shocks in an area that
is known to be prone to natural disasters. Lessons drawn from the implementation of the
strategy will also have valuable implications for future efforts in disaster management and
coping strategies for the region.
3) Past experience in South Asia has shown community-based efforts including microfinance
institutions to be vulnerable to such disasters (as their loan recovery rates and withdrawal
from savings decrease to the point of unsustainability), which is detrimental to the long-term
development potential of the affected region or community. A strategy to cope with disaster
thus should include a plan to provide financial support to the institutions that need it
particularly.
4) In case of weather-related risks, current advances in information technology can be harnessed
to better track and predict events as well as to target relief programs for maximum effect.
This will induce readiness on the part of the vulnerable population, and the public authorities
to cope with such risks.
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Box 5.1: The Recent Earthquake in Gujarat (India) and the Strategy for Reconstruction
On January 26, 2001, a devastating earthquake devastated lives, social infrastructure and economic
foundations in large areas in western and central parts of the state of Gujarat. By latest estimates, the quake
resulted in 20,000 deaths, 167,000 injuries, and destruction and damages to 1 million homes. Besides severe
damage to health and education infrastructure, with damage or destruction of 1200 health clinics and over
11,600 schools, extensive damage occurred in rural and urban water supply, power, telecommunications, and
small enterprises including single family artisans and rural industry. The most direct economic impact of the
earthquake is in the form of assets losses, estimated at $2.1 billion, of which private assets account for $1.6
billion. The immediate needs for the affected areas are provision of temporary housing while an extensive
housing reconstruction process is undertaken, restoration of lost records to house, land and other property
rights, restoration of public services, and securing the livelihood of vulnerable people.
Cross-country experiences suggest some core principles for reconstruction. Revival of the local economy is
an urgent need, which can be partly achieved through workfare programs, and direct transfers to households.
Empowering individuals and communities to foster local ownership and involvement in reconstruction are
crucial for reducing social tensions and ensuring sustainable development. Reconstruction efforts should
also take into account potential impact on public finances, use available private sector participation and
financing, and prioritize the greatest assistance for those most in need. In order to facilitate community-
driven reconstruction, effective networks for a decentralized system of reconstruction must be developed.
Decisions to rebuild or relocate villages, for example, should follow a transparent and participatory approach
to assess the wishes of the villagers, using local elected bodies wherever possible. Moreover, a participatory
approach must be based on effective communication between the government, the public and donors. The
strong presence of community-based organizations and NGOs in Gujarat (SEWA being just one example)
also creates opportunities for important synergies between such institutions and public programs for
reconstruction. The local knowledge, capacity and credibility of these institutions can be of great assistance
in identifying beneficiaries, distributing assistance, and ensuring transparency. Collaborations with such
institutions have already had major impact on the immediate relief efforts, and need to be persisted with in
the course of reconstruction.
The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have collaborated in a damage and needs assessment for
the disaster, as a valuable precursor of an effective strategy for reconstruction. The involvement of the
World Bank, in the form of financial and technical assistance, will be consistent with the above-mentioned
core principles, by supporting closely integrated efforts of communities, government, non-government
organizations and the private sector, while emphasizing community based self-help approaches. The Bank
will contribute to short-term financing needs for housing, rubble removal, temporary shelter, education,
health, local irrigation, infrastructure, public buildings, capacity building for local communities, and
establishment of disaster management capacity in the state. A medium and long-term role for the Bank is
also envisaged, assistance for which may be provided in a later phase.
Source: Gujarat Earthquake Recovery Program Assessment Report - a Joint Report by the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank to the Governments of Gujarat and India (March, 2001)
Integrating Social Protection into the World Bank's Program in South Asia
The principles outlined in the previous section should guide the Bank's involvement, along with
partners in respective governments, in designing social protection strategies for individual
countries in South Asia. The issues discussed in this paper also has some concrete implications
for the Bank's role as a development partner in these countries, in analytical work conducted to
underpin the development strategy for individual countries, as well as in specific programs
undertaken by the Bank in various sectors.
A wide range of programs supported by various sectors in the South Asia Region of the Bank,
encompassing diverse areas like rural development, environment, water, infrastructure, health and
education, address social protection issues highlighted in this report. The accompanying matrix
in the Annex gives an indicative list of projects and analytical exercises - ongoing and upcoming,
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and organized in terms of social protection themes - undertaken by the Region, that have social
protection components. It is important to note that this matrix only includes activities with
specific components that seek to address the issues of risk mitigation and coping, and does not
incorporate the remaining vast range of activities that have implications for the broader objective
of poverty-reduction. Moreover, the list is meant to be merely indicative, and not an exhaustive
accounting of all activities addressing issues related to social protection; developing such a list
will require a more in-depth look into each individual activity through the lens of social
protection.
In order to integrate the programs of the Region with the social protection objective, an important
next step will be to assess and evaluate the precise role of each relevant project in creating
opportunities for social protection, across various dimensions like risk mitigation, reduction and
coping. Understanding the social protection implications of all existing Bank projects in the
region will help in expanding, and in some cases, modifying some of these programs to address
issues of vulnerability better in future. More broadly, such in-depth assessment will underpin an
operational framework for Social Protection in the Region.
While such detailed exercise remains outstanding, it is possible to identify some broad principles
for integrating social protection into the Bank's program in the South Asia Region. These, along
with some specific mechanisms through which such integration can take place, are listed below.
* The mutually reinforcing nature of poverty and vulnerability necessarily imply that the
impact of any poverty-reduction strategy is conditioned by the extent to which the risks of the
poor are managed. Investing in education, for example, may not have the desired effect on
human development of the poorest if they are highly vulnerable to shocks, and interrupt their
children's education to cope with these shocks. Therefore, rather than having a narrow focus,
social protection should be integrated fully into the country's PRSP, where issues of risk
management should be explicitly incorporated into various sector-specific components of the
poverty reduction strategy. Such a multi-sector approach will be necessary to address risk
and vulnerability in a holistic manner.
* Risk, vulnerability and social protection issues need to be addressed more exhaustively in
PRSP initiatives than they have been so far. One way of doing this would be to make country
social risk assessments an integral part of the background country or sector-specific work for
PRSP, to work towards deriving a country-by-country profile of vulnerability issues and the
various policy options. This can done through integrating social protection with current
analytical vehicles, particularly public expenditure reviews (PERs) and poverty assessments,
by having them explicitly include analysis of risk and vulnerability issues along the lines
discussed in this paper. PRSPs of certain countries in the Africa region, like Mauritania,
Burkina Faso, Senegal and Mali, provide examples of strong focus on vulnerability, which
need to be emulated for countries in South Asia.
-PERs for example, should include explicit analysis of scale, incidence and impact of public
spending on social safety nets. Public expenditure on safety nets is often diffused between
different public agencies, and PERs can identify ways in which these programs can be
consolidated to increase efficiency and impact. Decentralization and devolution of
programs to local governments can improve efficiency and access, and PERs can explore
the mechanisms through which such reforms can take place. In countries where devolution
programs are currently underway, e.g. Pakistan, PERs can analyze whether such reforms
has had the desired effect on the availability and impact of safety nets.
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- Poverty assessments should contain explicit analysis of risk and vulnerability, and the
impact of vulnerability on the long-term productive potential of households. Analysis of
income or expenditure volatility will call for the need to develop longitudinal panel
household data sets for countries and integrating them into the poverty monitoring and
analysis system. To explore the factors that determine vulnerability, a poverty assessment
should be able to call on information from qualitative surveys that may not be available
from quantitative data.88
- Other analytical work, in sectors like health, education, nutrition, labor market and rural
development, should explore the potential of existing mechanisms to mitigate and cope
with risks, and the impact of inadequate risk management on outcomes in each sector. In
the specific South Asian context, analytical work must have a strong focus on the informal
sector, rural and urban, which is where most of the vulnerable are. The focus on the
informal sector is also imperative for analytical work on pension reform strategy for
specific South Asian countries like India. There is also a need for analytical work to focus
on the vulnerability of certain high-risk groups in South Asia, like working children and
widows, in addition to what has been done till now.
Integration of social protection in operational work of the Bank on the ground can be
achieved through a number of avenues. Some of these are suggested below.
- Bank supported anti-poverty programs (e.g. Poverty Alleviation Funds) should be
expanded to include financial instruments that can better deal with risk. In addition, Bank
supported conmmunity infrastructure projects should be designed to improve integration
with existing government programs aimed at coping with risks.
- Bank supported service delivery projects (health, education, rural services) should be able
to explore project designs that include insurance schemes to mitigate important risks, e.g.
sustainable forms of crop insurance in the case of rural services, or catastrophic health
insurance in the case of health projects.
* Finally, the Bank must be prepared to provide financial and technical support for innovative
instruments of social protection that provide access to savings and insurance using local,
community-based institutions (some examples are provided in this paper), and also explore
the possible role of an innovation like index-based insurance to provide much-needed
protection against widespread shocks. These approaches need to be tried on a pilot basis to
understand their role, scope and limitations. Such endeavors should have a special focus on
monitoring and evaluation, which will help in learning the best practices on the ground,
depending on local conditions, in order to inform scaling-up of current efforts and future
design of social protection instruments.
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Annex: Indicative List of Activities in South Asia Region with Social Protection Component
social Lending Services Non-Lending/ Analytical Implemen- Risk Reduction, Mitigation &
Protection Projects Being Projects in the Pipeline (AAAIESW) Coun~try ting Sector Coping Elements
Themes Implemented
Microfinance mi: Expand Mitigate risk by helping smooth
outreach of microcredit Bangladesh SASFP consumption; reduce risk by
including urban poor and i
micro-entrepreneurs
Ultra-hardcore Poor. Risk mitigation and reduction
Target the very poor with Bangla- SASFP through microcredit,
no access to .icrocredit desh complemented by safety net
Micro- no programs
fimance Microfinance Review: Focuses on microfinance as a risk
Assess potential for India SASFP mitigating tool for poor
sustainable development households.
of microfinance households.
Financial Sector Study:
Overview of the financial Nepal SASFP microfinance as a nsk mitigating
sector including tool
microfinance
Social Investment
Program: Grants to Strengthen social services delivery,
Norgani cawll Bangla- SASH' and enhance local institutional
organizations wtic desh SASFP capacity to help mitigate and cope
inaser cess to exlue with various kinds of risks
services to excluded
Community groups
-Driven Rural Women's
Programs Empowerment: Strengthen India SASES Mitigate risks of exclusion and
women's productive and disempowerment
organizational ability
Poverty Alleviation Fund: Increasing incomes and reducing
Support poverty alleviation Pakistan SASFP vulnerability of poor households,
programs of NGOs and empowering the poor (esp.
local organizations women)
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tia n PrectsBeingPrtLending s Non-Lending/ Analytical Implemen- Risk Reduction, Mitigation &
mes Projects Being Projects in the Pipeline (AAA/ESW) Country ting Sector Coping Elements
hemes Implemented
Mitigate risks through credit and
ommunity- District Poverty Initiative savings programs; reduce risk and
Driven Project (DPIP): in the states India SASRD poverty through income
PFrograms of Rajasthan, Andhra generation; building capacity of
(Continued) Pradesh & Madhya Pradesh local organizations for service
delivery and mutual assistance
India: the Challenge of
Old Age Income Security: SASFP Assess what reforms are necessary
Analysis of current (with to mitigate risks associated with
pension programs in India Social old-age; programs include
India, and developing a Protection employee pension programs and
framework for pension Network) social assistance for the aged poor.
.___ ____ ____ ____ ___ __  reform
Child Labor in Nepal: Nepal SASHD
Labor Situational Analysis
Market Exploited children in Sri
Risks Lanka: are their rights Sri Lanka SASHD Assess the extent and causes of
protected ? child labor, and promote
interventions that will serve to
Breaking the cycle: reduce child labor, especially child
Working children in Bangladesh SASHD labor that is harmful to human
Bangladesh capital accumulation
SASHDUnderstanding children's (with
work and its Impact: Nepal UNICEF &
Nepal (ongoing) NIC) &
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Social Lending Services Non-Lending/ Implemen- Risk Reduction, Mitigation &
rotection Projects Analytical Country ting Sector Coping Elements
hmes Imle einge Projects in the Pipeline (AAAIESW)
HPSP AIVIAIDS Prevention Bangladesh SASHD
Program Bnlds AH2ndrNationam HlV/AlDS Reduce health risk from
Health Risks: Control India SASHD HIV/AIDS through prevention
Direct
Instruments AIDS Prevention Sri Lanka SASHD
for Disease Tuberculosis Control India SASHD
Prevention
Malaria Control India SASHD Reduce the likelihood of epidemics
and reduce health risks of children
Immunization strengthening India SASHD
Arsenic Mitigation Bangladesh SASES
Reduce health risks associated with
Air Quality Management Bangladesh SASES enviromnent degradation
Indus Pollution Prevention India SASES
Mitigate risks associated with
Coal Sector Environment & India SASES environment & involuntary
Health Risks: Social Mitigation resettlement
Indirect India Indoor Air
Instruments Pollution Study - to be ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Assess health risks of indoor airInstruments Pollution Study - to be pollution and examine n-titigpl ii
to Reduce followed by "Clean India SASEI techniques - focus on poor women
Health Cooking Fuels" and children
Risks initiative and_childre
NWFP Community Pakistan SASEI
Infrastructure Jammu & Kashmir Reduce health risk by improving
Community Infrastructure Pakistan SASEI access to and quality of basic
Community Infrastructure India SASEI services in communities
Second Community Water Sri Lanka SASEI
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ocial Lending Services Non-Lending/ Implemen- Risk Reduction, Mitigation &
rtcin PrjcsBigAnalytical Country ting Sector Coping Elements
hemes Implementedin Projects in the Pipeline (AAA/ESW)
Andhra Pradesh Cyclone
Emergency India SASEI Cope with disasters through
Orissa Cyclone Emergency India SASEI investments to restore lost publicassets; long term planning for
Disaster Gujarat Emergency India SASEI coping strategy for future hazards
anage- Earthquake Reconstruction
nent & Water Resource &
larvest Risk Drought Management: Assess how to mitigate risks
Build a comprehensive Pakistan SASES associated with crop failure and
framework for more
effective use of water water shortage
resources
Legal and Judicial Capacity
Building: Improve civil Reduce the risks of exploitation
justice system; includes Bangla- es poiaaon
strengthening small courts, desh SASFP and violence, especially among
legal aid, and legal women and the poor
awareness
Other Risks Singrauli Social & Mitigate risks to health
'e.g. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(environmnent-related) and(e.g Environment Development: India SASES livelihood associated with
nvironment Build environmentally industrial development in marginal
Legal) sustainable local livelihoods mdustnal region
Mandatory review and Ensure that risks associated with
safeguards policy: to involuntary resettlement,
ensure that social and SAR- SASES indigenous peoples and
environmental Regional environment are minimized in
safeguard policies are Bank supported projects
applied
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l Deolalikar and Gaiha (1993a). Also, preliminary analyses of a panel survey from rural Pakistan suggest
that while there was a high incidence of poverty (between 21 and 29 percent) in the sample villages, a large
proportion of these households (46 to 51 percent) exited poverty from one year to the next, and a very small
proportion stayed poor over the entire period of 5 years (Baulch and McCulloch, 1998)
2 For example, in India, rising food prices were found to have led to larger reductions in nutrient intake for
women than for men (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1990).
3 Mari Bhat (1994) for India, Rahman et al (1992) for Bangladesh
4For more details on an operational definition of Vulnerability, refer to the presentation by Holzmann at
Vulnerability Workshop on March 13, 2001, the World Bank
5 Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1992). Evidence from other developing regions also indicate that incomes
of the poor are subject to large fluctuations - over a 20-year period, an estimated 78 percent of rural
Ethiopian households suffered a harvest failure (Dercon, 1999; Kinsey et al., 1998); a study in China finds
that for the poorest 10 percent of households, 40 percent of an income shock is passed on as lower
consumption, compared to only 10 percent for the richest third of the households, and richer households
tend to have better access to insurance mechanisms (Jalan and Ravallion, 1999).
6 Murdoch (1998a)
7 Morduch (1999)
8 E.g. Deaton (1992a), Paxson (1992)
9 Aggregate income uncertainty is shown to induce Indian farm households to hold less risky portfolios,
sacrificing higher expected returns for lower risk and greater liquidity (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993)
10 See Lim and Townsend (1998), Paxson and Chaudhuri (1994)
" Evidence from other developing regions, notably Africa and Thailand seems to confirm this hypothesis
(for evidence from Thailand, see Townsend, 1995a)
12 Lim and Townsend (1998) found that bullock transactions can in fact add volatility to income in rural
south India instead of smoothing them during times of community-level shocks
13 A study of 6 villages in semi-arid regions of India examined how school attendance drops along with
downward seasonal fluctuations in family income, that depend on the vagaries of the monsoon and are
therefore hard to anticipate (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997)
4 Behrman (1988), Behrman and Deolalikar (1990)
15 For example, in Nepal in 1996, 58 percent of poor households received transfers, and the share of
transfers in pre-transfer income of poor households was as much as 58 percent.
6 Studies from other regions have findings similar to Townsend's (e.g. Deaton, 1992b for Cote d'lvoire)
17 Hoff (1997) has a theoretical model. A study of reciprocity in fishing villages in Kerala, India finds
some evidence for this theory (Platteau and Abraham, 1987).
18 Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) and Morduch (1991) - using data on the ICRISAT villages
19 Rosenzweig (1988)
20 Rashid (1991) finds this pattern in Pakistan
21 Fafchamps (1992)
22 Evidence from Africa indicate that transfers are unable to offset aggregate income shocks (e.g. Czukas et
al., 1998); to make things worse such aggregate shocks often amount to a large part of the income
fluctuations of poor households - a study in northern Nigeria shows that as much as 58 percent of the
variation in agricultural output was caused by such aggregate shocks.
61
23 The welfare-based measure proposed by Holzmann (1990) to evaluate the impact of public programs
differs from the "traditional" approaches by taking into account, firstly, life-cycle considerations, and
secondly, market imperfections.
24 As pointed out in Morduch (1999)
25 Sinha and Lipton (1999) report that 30 percent of households reported increased incidence of illness as a
result of successive harvest failures in Sri Lanka in 1995 and 1996.
26 The harvest failures in Sri Lanka in 1995 and 1996 led to increased indebtedness in 80 percent of the
households in eight villages.
27 Voices of the Poor, Volume 1 (1999)
28 Foster (1995) and Rose (1999) respectively
29 E.g. Dasgupta (1992), Cain (1981)
30 Many traditional coping strategies such as gathering wood, hunting, fishing, and harvesting herbs and
fruits must rely on increasingly over-utilized common resources. In India, for instance, reports indicate that
gum collection is no longer profitable due to a drastic fall in the availability of gum trees. Women are
much more dependent on gathering forest resources, and the disappearance of non-timber forest products
affects their well being disproportionately (Voices of the Poor, Volume 1).
31 Dreze and Srinivasan (1997) finds that in India, for a given household size and child-adult ratio, female-
headed households are poorer than male-headed households, wheree widows head as many as 64 percent of
female-headed households.
32 According to surveys conducted by Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) based in Ahmedabad,
India.
33 Eswara Prasad (1993)
34 Eswara Prasad (1995)
35 See Owen (1995) for a more detailed discussion
36 This section draws from Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), Chapters 1 and 7 in Grootaert and Patrinos (eds.),
(1999), and situational analyses of child labor in individual South Asian countries by Rie Hiraoka, South
Asia Sector, Health, Population and Nutrition (SASHD), The World Bank.
37 Significant regional differences in child labor trends in India are found to correlate strongly with total
fertility and infant mortality rates, enrollment and literacy rates, female participation in non-agricultural
work (greater participation is associated with lower incidence of child labor), the level of infrastructure
development, and the rise in investment and output per worker.
38 Bangladesh Garment Manufacturer's Exporter's Association
39 For example, the two programs in Bangladesh together cover only about 17 percent of the economically
active children in Bangladesh
40 For example, floods and natural disasters are more important sources of risk in Bangladesh and some
parts of India than in the rest of the region; the risk of civil strife and economic instability may be more
pronounced in Sri Lanka and Pakistan respectively
4t The first column of Table 2b shows the important sources of risk for which workfare programs can serve
as mitigating and/or coping mechanisms
42 While the cost of transferring one rupee of income to participants in India's JRY was 1.9 rupees, because
the participants included large numbers of non poor due to mis-targeting, the cost of transferring one rupee
of income to a poor participant was as high as 4.35 rupees.
43 In Pakistan, various Income Generation Program for Refugee Areas (IGPRA) schemes have been in
operation since 1984, generating between 5 and 23 million person-days of employment annually. Sri
Lanka Janasaviya program is no longer in operation.
44 This short discussion is based on BIDS and IFPRI (1985) and Subbarao (1997)
45 The TR program is similar to FFW, with the distinction that it aims to generate employment for the poor
from public works mainly during the rainy season. The program generates an estimated 15 million man-
days of employment annually
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46 The total cost per person-day of employment created for the FFW and TR program, as well as the ratio of
wage cost to total cost (all 1991-92 figures), compare favorably with comparable public works programs in
developing nations.
47 The average cost per person-day of employment of around $1.2 compares favorably with programs of
this type in the developing world.
48 Walker and Ryan (1990). More evaluations of EGS can be found in Dev (1995), Bhende et al. (1992),
Acharya (1990), Acharya and Panwalkar (1988) and PEO (1980).
49 Subbarao (1997)
50 Osmani (1991) and Ravallion (1991)
51 Aggregate figures from Annual Report 1997-98, Government of India, Ministry of Rural Areas and
Employment.
52 Gaiha et al. (1998)
53 Subbarao (1997)
54 For discussions on women's participation in workfare programs, see Deolalikar and Gaiha (1993b) and
Dandekar (1983)
55 World Bank (1995)
56 Naseem (2000)
57 Social Development in Pakistan (1999)
58 Subbarao et al. (1997). For more on targeting of Zakat, see Shirazi (1996)
59 The discussion for this program is drawn mostly from World Bank (2000a)
60 World Bank (2000b) based on data from Sri Lanka Integrated Survey, 1999-2000
61 Grosh (1994)
62 World Bank (1997)
63 Approximately 71 percent of the clients are women and 89 percent are rural, compared to global averages
of 61 and 47 percent respectively (World Bank, 1997).
64 See Mustafa et al (1996), Khandker (1996), Montgomery et al (1996), and Khandker (1998) for evidence
on targeting by a number of programs in Bangladesh.
65 See, for example, Khandker (1998) and Morduch (1998a)
66 Khan et al (1998) track 35 BRAC borrowers over 2 years and find that 67 percent of credit is used for
investment, 12 percent to repay loans, 7 percent for household consumption and the rest for other activities.
67 See Mustafa et al. (1996), Zaman (1999).
68 Wood and Sharif (1997)
69 Morduch (1999)
70 For detailed discussion, see Nayar and Faisal (1999), Zaman (1999) and articles from the Web site on
Flood of 1998, Grameen Trust.
71 Morduch (1999)
72For example, in addition to individual savings, the BRI-UD attracts savings from community groups like
schools and municipalities.
73 Morduch (1999)
74 See McGuire (1999) for a discussion on policy and regulation for sustainable microfinance, including the
prudential regulations necessary for institutions that accept savings.
75 The main sources for this sub-section are Skees et al (1999) and Yaron, Benjamin and Piprek (1997).
76 This condition was suggested by Hazell (1992)
77 The I/P ratio also measures the average return to farmers' own investment in the insurance, i.e. the
number of dollars received on average per dollar prernium paid.
78The discussion that follows is drawn largely from Skees et al. (1999), as well as on discussions with
Panayotis Varangis, DECRG.
63
79Such schemes already exist in a number of countries, including the US, India, Sweden and Canada.
so Existing literature also indicate that reinsurers tend to have short memories - after a major catastrophe,
prices increase significantly or reinsurers simply pull out.
81 For example, Dreze and Srinivasan (1997)
82 According to recent estimates, formal pensions cover under 10 percent of the labor force (Palacios and
Pallares, 2000).
83 A thorough evaluation of such social assistance programs will require systematic collection of data that is
still lacking. An important issue to consider will be whether public transfers supplant private transfers as
evidence from some countries outside South Asia suggests.
84 The World Bank (2000c). For more on social security issues for India, see Van Ginneken (ed.) (1998).
For a discussion on social security for workers in the informal sector in Kerala, India, see Pillai (1996).
8 World Bank (1994)
86 Some institutions have been able to successfully introduce long-term products - SEWA provides
insurance against death, disability and widowhood to its clients in the informal sector, and a microfinance
institution (called Association for Social Advancement) with 3 million members in Bangladesh offers a five
year "contractual savings" option (Rutherford, 2000)
87 For an example, see discussion in the previous chapter on the impact of the 1998 floods in Bangladesh on
microfinance institutions.
88 The Poverty Assessment for Pakistan (2001) currently underway would attempt to address these issues,
by looking at the extent and impact of vulnerability, using quantitative as well as qualitative information
(from case studies at select sites). The availability of a 10-year household panel data set - to be updated
through a re-survey of the panel - offers the scope to analyze the nature and determinants of income and
expenditure volatility.
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